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ABSTRACT
Prior research studying the effects of CEOs on innovation are primarily based on Upper
Echelon Theory, which indicates the intrapersonal characteristics among executives in their
experiences, values, and personalities could be indispensable antecedents for firm innovation,
while the implications of their interpersonal differences have hardly yet received enough
attention they deserve. To advance CEO social networks and innovation research, therefore, we
attempt to provide some insightful findings through this dissertation series with two papers. In
the first paper, we examine the general relationships between two important CEO social network
characteristics (network centrality and structural holes) and firm exploratory innovation, and then
we further investigate, in the second paper, how these two structural attributes have an impact on
the performance implications of temporal transitions between exploration and exploitation. Our
research adds value to social network literature, innovation literature, ambidexterity literature
and strategic leadership research.
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EFFECTS OF STRUCTURAL EMBEDDEDNESS AND STRUCTURAL HOLES ON
EXPLORATORY INNOVATION

ABSTRACT
While CEOs have been considered as an important driver for firm innovation, current
research has not gained many insights on the influence of CEO social networks. To advance
CEO social capital and innovation research, we integrate the upper-echelons perspective with
social networks theory to examine the effects of structural attributes of CEO social networks on
exploratory innovation. We predict that CEO network centrality has an inverted U-shape effect
on exploratory innovation. Further, we predict that CEO structural holes have a positive effect,
and it also strengthens the effect of network centrality. We test our hypotheses with a sample of
7,543 firm-year observations with 1,101 public U.S. firms from 2000 to 2014. The findings
provide strong supports for our predictions. Our study has important theoretical implications for
innovation management and CEO social capital research.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Exploratory innovation significantly shapes a firm's growth and adaptation of continuous
technological changes. (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Firms that fail to keep up with the rapid
technological advancements often have difficulty sustaining their competitive advantage. Among
the numerous factors that influence a firm's exploratory innovation, CEOs play a crucial role.
Collectively, prior studies have shown a vast array of CEOs personal characteristics are
correlated with their firm's exploration innovation, such as leadership style (Ling et al., 2008),
demographics (Lee, Kim, & Bae, 2020; Lewellyn & Kahle, 2012; Simsek, 2007; Zona, 2016),
psychological traits (Matzler, Bauer, & Mooradian, 2015; Kashmiri, Nicol, & Arora, 2017; Purba
& Paundra, 2018), cognitive attributes (Galasso & Simcoe, 2011; Zhang et al., 2017), and career
horizon (Cho & Kim; 2017).
However, while existing research investigates various CEOs' individual characteristics,
very few have examined the influence of CEOs' social networks on exploratory innovation.
CEOs, as individuals, are embedded in social networks. The behaviors of individuals are not just
determined by their intrapersonal characteristics but also their interpersonal relationships with
others. Likewise, upper echelons research proposes that executives' social ties can be considered
as conduits for executives to access to, transfer, distribute and control firm resources (e.g.,
Collins & Clark, 2003; McDonald, Khanna, & Westphal, 2008). In the innovation management
literature, previous research has recognized that a CEO's social capital is a crucial source of
innovation capabilities (Cao, Maruping, & Takeuchi, 2006; Colloins & Clark, 2003; Katila &
Ahuja, 2002). Yet, empirical evidence is sparse, and we do not have many insights. Therefore, to
advance our knowledge on CEO and innovation, we theorize and test the relationships between
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structural characteristics of CEO social networks and firm exploratory innovation outcomes.
Drawing on the theories of network embeddedness (Baum & Dutton, 1996; Cao,
Maruping, & Takeuchi, 2006; Derorian, 2002; Granovetter, 1985; Rost, 2011) and structural
holes, this study theorizes and test the effects of structural characteristics of CEO social network
on the degree of exploratory innovation. Specifically, we examine the two most fundamental and
important structural characteristics: network centrality and structural holes. Network centrality
refers to the degree of embeddedness of CEOs in their social network. The higher the network
centrality, the more ties a CEO has and contacts the CEO can access. The degree of structural
holes reflects the level of closure of CEOs' ego networks. The higher the degree of structural
holes, the sparser a CEO's ego network. We argue that CEO network centrality first increases a
firm's degree of exploratory innovation due to increased access to information and resources.
However, such a benefit would have diminishing returns, and the relationship turns negative.
Further, we propose that the degree of structural holes has a direct positive effect on exploratory
innovation, as well as an interaction effect with network centrality.
To test our hypotheses, we gathered social network information of CEOs from BoardEx,
and we used patents-based indicators of exploratory innovation. Our sample includes 7,543 firmyear observations with unique 1,101 S&P 1500 firms, including 1,833 CEOs from 2000 to 2014.
The results, together with multiple robustness tests, largely support the curvilinear relationship
between network centrality and exploratory innovation, as well as the interaction effect between
network centrality and structural holes. Specifically, we found that the network centrality of
CEOs has an inverted U-shape relationship with the exploratory innovation outcomes.
Interestingly, the inverted U-shape curve is highly skewed towards the declining side, indicating
that increasing network centrality predominantly inhibits exploratory innovation rather than
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stimulating it. As for structural holes, we found that it generally increases exploratory
innovation, and such a positive effect is more prominent when network centrality is at low levels.
Our findings extend the current research on CEOs' social capital and technological
innovation. First, we show that structural embeddedness exhibits multifaceted and countervailing
influence over exploratory innovation. While structural embeddedness brings information and
resource benefits, it can also be very costly. In the context of exploratory innovation, the costs of
high embeddedness can outweigh the benefits, and firms produce less exploratory innovation
when CEOs are highly embedded in their social networks. Second, our findings regarding
structural holes show that there are boundary conditions on structural holes. While structural
holes do show a positive relationship with exploratory innovation, such benefits of structural
holes diminish as a CEO's network centrality increases. Taken together, our findings indicate that
exploratory innovation is most productive when CEOs are moderately embedded in a sparse
network with some structural holes. When CEOs are deeply embedded in a sparse network, the
abundance of structural holes does not bring any benefits but may actually inhibit exploratory
innovation.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 CEO and Innovation
Innovation capabilities are pivotal to firms that encounter a challenge to gain and sustain
competitive advantage over the long haul, and this is more so for firms that are in the
technology-intensive industry. In the wake of increasing complexities in the business domain,
CEOs make critical managerial decisions on R&D investments and innovation trajectories. A
wealth of research revolves around senior executives' influence on innovation, focusing,
particularly, on the CEO's interpersonal characteristics (e.g., Kashmiri, Nicol & Arora, 2017;
Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010; Simsek, 2007). This stream largely hinges on the upper echelon
perspective, highlighting that senior executives' actions and their personalized interpretations of
the strategic innovation situations are associated with their experiences, values, and personalities
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984).
Prior research in this line of inquiry has yielded fruitful insights into how CEO individual
characteristics might affect innovation, but it has not explicitly studied the role of CEO social
networks in explaining firm innovation and its associated variations. To close this research gap,
we propose in this paper that, from a holistic network perspective, CEO interpersonal social
connections are likely to offer implications of significance on firm innovative dynamism, which
is determined by the inherent structural characteristics embedded in the social network. Put
differently, given the intricate and intertwined nature of CEO networks, a research approach of
network structure analysis may provide profound insights with regard to the corporate innovation
dynamics.
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2.2 CEO Social Network and Innovation
In the strategic management literature, most research of CEO social connections and
innovation uses a dyadic lens instead of a holistic network lens (Cruz, Gómez-Mejia, & Becerra,
2010; Ling et al., 2008; Shen, 2003). For instance, Ling et al. (2008) explored the CEO-TMT
interface that can explain the role of transformational CEOs in promoting entrepreneurship
orientation. Shen (2003) addressed the CEO-Directors relationships in corporate governance as
CEO tenure advances based on an evolutionary perspective. Zhang and Wang (2020) revealed
the CEO-TMT dynamics in terms of learning goal orientation on firm innovation on analysis of a
sample of 164 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in China. Although such a dyadic
approach simplifies the complexity and dynamism of CEOs' social connections and gains fruitful
insights, a network lens that considers the entire networks of CEOs and their interconnected
social contacts can provide a richer view. The network lens helps explain the additional
variations of potential benefits and harms of CEOs' social networks beyond the dyadic lens and
gains greater insights into the influence of CEOs' social networks on various firm-level
outcomes. In recent years, a growing body of literature draws from the network lens and shows
evidence that social networks of executives have a considerable impact on various firm
behaviors and outcomes, such as entrepreneurial orientation (Cao, Simsek, & Jansen, 2015),
mergers & acquisitions (El-Khatib, Fogel, & Jandik, 2015), innovation (Faleye, Kovacs, &
Venkateswaran, 2014), business ethics (Griffin et al., 2021), and corporate governance (Brown et
al., 2012).
In the current literature, researchers theorize that social networks of CEOs influence firmlevel outcomes through two underlying mechanisms – the sharing of information and resource,
and the diffusing of power and influence (Brass & Burkhardt, 1992; Burt, 1992, 2000; Coleman,
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1988; Granovetter, 1973, 2005; Haunschild, 1993; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Reagans & McEvily,
2003). Concerning the channel of information and resource sharing, CEO social connections
could serve as supplement alternatives, beyond formal managerial systems, to capture
information and signify managerial quality and competency (Griffin et al., 2021). For example,
Ke et al. (2019) has found that social connections among top executives can help eliminate bias
or misinterpretations in information sharing during the forecast-generating process, and so
improve managerial accuracy. Likewise, the power and influence channel of CEO networks may
empower CEOs more freedom of managerial discretions to impact normal or optimal corporate
regulations. For instance, it has been suggested that well-connected CEOs can increase their
entrenchment and influence the corporate decision by their position in the social hierarchy (ElKhatib, Fogel, & Jandik, 2015). Therefore, we have reasons to believe that both mechanisms can
influence a firm's exploratory innovation as well. The social connections of a CEO provide him
or her with unbiased information about exploratory innovation during the forecast-generating
process, while the CEO's social position allows him or her to mobilize available resources to
invest in exploration-related R&Ds.
Note that in social networks analysis, there are three interrelated dimensions – structural,
relational, cognitive dimension. The structural dimension attains to the structural elements
originated from CEO networks that partially determine opportunities and constraints to access
valuable resources and information (Nahapiet & Ghoshal,1998). The relational dimension of the
network analysis approach refers to the extent to which mutual respect, trust, and close
association exist between CEOs and their contacts (Granovetter, 1992; Nahapiet &
Ghoshal,1998); the cognitive dimension focuses on sharing representations, visions, collective
narratives, and congruent goals among contacts (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Nahapiet &
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Ghoshal,1998; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). In this study, we investigate the structural dimension by
integrating with the two most fundamental attributes of this dimension - network centrality and
structural holes.
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CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
3.1 CEO Network Centrality and Exploratory Innovation
The network centrality of CEO social networks reflects the overall embeddedness of a
CEO in the executive network. CEOs with higher centrality are directly or indirectly connected
to more individuals in the executive network. We postulate that the degree of CEO network
centrality has an inverted U-shaped effect on the exploratory innovation. First, a CEO with many
ties to other executives is likely to facilitate the effectiveness of exchange with knowledge and
information (Inkpen & Tsang, 2005). Occupying diverse sources of social connections, the CEO
is capable of accessing, controlling, and distributing the flow of substantial information and
knowledge from varying contacts (Cao, Maruping, & Takeuchi, 2006; Galbraith, 1973; Habib &
Victor, 1991), thereby influencing organizational exploratory potentials (Kogut & Zander, 1992;
Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Second, high network centrality enables a CEO to exert greater
control over the flow of knowledge and resources toward exploratory activities and to be more
conscious about and effective in pursuing exploratory innovation (Cao, Maruping, & Takeuchi,
2006; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Smith, Collins, & Clark, 2005). In addition, highly centralized
CEOs in their networks are more capable of validating the accuracy and reliability of information
and knowledge exchanged (Bellamy, Ghosh, & Hora, 2014) since managers with a higher
centrality might have multiple indirect links to the same contact. Echols & Tsai (2005) has
illustrated that highly reliable and trustworthy partnerships can be achieved by these
interconnected connections in the ego network to protect and advance specific knowledge and
benefit exploratory activities. Furthermore, CEOs having a lot of social ties are positioned to
prefer risk-taking initiatives (Carpenter, Pollock, & Leary, 2003; Ferris, Javakhadze, & Rajkovic,
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2019; Simsek, 2007). When a CEO has a larger network of social relationships, she/he is not
only able to reside in a better position to evaluate and manage riskier exploratory innovation
activities but also able to organize and coordinate resources to take advantage of alternatives in
case of emergency (Cao, Simsek, & Jansen, 2015).
Nonetheless, the positive benefits on exploratory innovation from increasing network
centrality are likely to turn into a negative one as CEOs become very central in the network due
to redundant information (Burt, 1992), shared frame of reference, and convergent cognition
(Leventhal & March, 1993; Simsek, Lubatkin, & Floyd, 2003; Smith & Cao, 2007). Information
redundancy can occur when a CEO is overly embedded in a closed social network raise the cost
of effective communication between CEOs and others (Burt, 1992; Cao, Simsek, & Jansen,
2015), in turn intervening the accuracy and timeliness of managerial decisions on exploratory
activities. Next, individuals from similar groups clustered around a CEO in all probability have a
collective mental framework and similar modes of reasoning (Simsek, Lubatkin, & Floyd, 2003),
which suppresses the generation process of new ideas and novel solutions (Leventhal & March,
1993; Smith & Cao, 2007). The exploratory potential, in such a circumstance, might shrink as a
result and the search and attempt for corresponding groundbreaking solutions and strategies
would become myopic (Leventhal & March, 1993). Then risky exploratory activities will be
evaluated in a narrower horizon and with a short-term bias, which inhibits the discovery of novel
opportunities (Smith & Cao, 2007). All these dampening mechanisms may thus mitigate the
effects of network centrality on stimulating exploratory innovation to lower levels.
Together, these arguments suggest that a moderate degree of CEO social network
centrality is probably the most conducive to exploratory innovation. Therefore, we hypothesize
that:
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Hypothesis 1. The degree of CEO network centrality has an inverted U-shaped
relationship with the level of exploratory innovation.

3.2 CEO Network Structural Holes and Exploratory Innovation
We argue that more exploration innovation is produced when a CEO situates in a position
that has a higher degree of structural holes (higher bridging social capital). While network
centrality reflects the overall degree of structural embeddedness of individuals, structural holes
reflect how they are embedded in neighborhoods or other social structures (Burt, 1992). A
structural hole is a missing or weak connection between two network members bridged by a
broker. Actors located on the structural hole bridge the different information flows or allocate
recourses among distinct groups, and the actors have the opportunity to create novelty by
combining information from distinct groups (Burt, 2004). One of the most important ways to
create exploratory innovation is by recombining distinct technology fields (Corredoira &
Banerjee, 2015; Karim & Kaul, 2015). Granovetter (1973) suggests that inventors seeking
knowledge from weakly connected fields are likely to access a broader array of ideas than those
who focus on a limited and cohesive set of knowledge. Similarly, when a CEO occupies a
network position that has more of these bridging opportunities, they have a better chance of
moving beyond the local boundary of knowledge and technology and accessing knowledge and
technology from other fields. Acquiring knowledge externally from other fields allow CEOs to
potentially integrate various elements and structures of knowledge that have never been
combined before (Cao, Maruping, & Takeuchi, 2006). In addition, such boundary-spanning
opportunities can help CEOs overcome their dominant mental inertia and challenge the existing
frames of reference and modes of reasoning (Laursen & Salter, 2006), which further stimulates

11

their firm's exploratory innovation.
Unlike network centrality, we argue that while the degree of structural holes may have
diminishing returns, but its effect on exploratory innovation is not likely to become negative. A
higher degree of structural holes does not incur information overload or redundancy, and it
increases the opportunities for the focal CEOs to bridge diverse information and resources from
different clusters in the network. Prior research on firm-level suggests that only a limited number
of companies are likely to oversearch through their external ties for exploratory opportunities
(Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Thus, it is unlikely that CEOs can exhaust all such bridging
opportunities in their network. Taking the above arguments together, we hypothesize that:

Hypothesis 2. The degree of CEO network structural holes has a positive relationship
with the level of exploratory innovation.

3.3 Interactions between CEO Network Centrality and Structural Holes
Hypothesis one suggests that peak exploratory innovation occurs when a CEO occupies
an intermediate level of network centrality as this enables the firm to benefit from information
advantages without suffering from information redundancy and overload. We expect the degree
of structural holes to moderate the favorable impact of network centrality on exploratory
innovation, such that the inflection point of the curvilinear effect occurs at a higher level and the
slope of the left half of the inverted U-shaped curve becomes steeper. As CEOs' overall
embeddedness increases in an open and less dense network with more structural holes, not only
can they access a greater amount of information and network-embedded resources, but they are
also exposed to diverse knowledge from different industries and technological fields. As a result,
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their firms may produce a greater amount of exploratory innovation. On the contrary, when
CEOs are more embedded in a dense and closed network, one that without many structural holes,
the positive impact of network centrality on exploratory innovation may be attenuated. In such
networks, increasing embeddedness can still gain CEOs a greater amount of overall information;
however, there is a high degree of redundancy in this information, and the technical information
is homogeneous and concentrated. It is less likely for CEOs to identify novel technological
opportunities, and the overall exploratory innovation may be reduced. Thus, as CEO network
centrality changes from low- to some moderate- levels, the degree of structural holes can
enhance the positive effect of centrality.
The negative effect of high levels of CEO network centrality is also reinforced by the
degree of structural holes. As stated before, the generation of exploratory innovation is based on
the process of association and combination of existing information and knowledge from different
fields (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). However, externally acquired diverse
information and knowledge from multiple fields are often distant and difficult to be integrated
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Van Wijk, Jansen, & Lyles, 2008). Thus, it takes a considerable
amount of resources and time for firms to integrate and combine diverse technology from
different fields. As for CEOs who are responsible for making decisions on their firm's R&D, it is
a demanding task for them to analyze all possible innovation trajectories. At high levels of
centrality, CEOs are already burdened with information overload and redundancy, and more
exploration opportunities do not bring more benefits. A recent study shows that executive job
demand harms firm innovation and reduces the share of exploratory innovation (Zhu, Jia, and Li,
2021). Similarly, a high degree of structural holes causes more harm than good when CEOs are
deeply embedded in the network, and firms led by such CEOs become less productive in
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generating exploratory innovation. In other words, a lower degree of structural holes is more
beneficial when CEOs are deeply embedded in the network. In this circumstance, there are
overall fewer bridging opportunities, but such a limited set of opportunities reduce the resource,
time, and CEO job demands that are required to produce exploratory innovation. Thus, at high
levels of CEO network centrality, exploratory innovation is higher when the degree of structural
holes is low.
To summarize, the degree of structural holes strengthens the inverted U-shaped
relationship between network centrality and exploratory innovation; that is, the peak level of
exploratory innovation output occurs at a higher level when CEOs have more structural holes in
the social networks and the slopes of the curve on both sides steepen. Therefore, we hypothesize
that:

Hypothesis 3. The degree of structural holes in CEO networks moderates the inverted Ushaped relationship between the network centrality and the level of exploratory innovation, such
that the curvilinear effect becomes more salient when the CEO has more structural holes in the
networks.
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CHPATER 4
METHODS
4.1 Data and Sample
We collected our data from multiple sources: BoardEx, Execucomp, Compustat, CRSP,
and patents data. First, we drew social relationships data of CEOs in the U.S. publicly traded
firms from BoardEx, which specializes in relationship mapping and intelligence over one million
professionals and senior managers who served or are serving private and public organizations in
the U.S. and Europe and records a comprehensive set of biographic information of directors and
executives such as name, gender, job title, tenure, etc. (Chang & Wu, 2021). Then, we matched
BoardEx with Execucomp to obtain complete data of CEOs. The matching results in a total
sample of 5,845 CEOs. Our patents data were constructed from two sources. We obtained
complete patent information from Google Patents Public Data, which is a worldwide
bibliographic and U.S. full-text dataset of patent publications provided by IFI CLAIMS Patent
Services. We then matched the patent data with our sample firms using the KPSS Patent-CRSP
matching dataset (Kogan et al., 2017). Finally, we merged our CEO data with patents data, and
firms with no granted patents or missing data were dropped from the sample. The final sample
consisted of 7,543 firm-year observations with unique 1,101 public firms, including 1,833 CEOs
in the U.S. from 2000 to 2014.
4.2 Measures
4.2.1 Dependent Variable

Exploratory Innovation. Exploratory innovation was measured using new technology
subclass of a firm's patent portfolio, which is a commonly used approach (Ahuja & Lampert,
2001; Carnabuci & Operti, 2013; Kotha, Zheng, & George, 2011). Patents are each assigned a
classification term indicating the subject to which the invention relates. Each classification term
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consists of a symbol such as "A01B33/00" (which represents "tilling implements with rotary
driven tools"). The first letter is the "section symbol" consisting of a letter from "A" ("Human
Necessities") to "H" ("Electricity") or "Y" for emerging cross-sectional technologies. This is
followed by a two-digit number to give a "class symbol" (for example, "A01" represents
"Agriculture; forestry; animal husbandry; trapping; fishing"). The final letter makes up the
"subclass" (A01B represents "Soil working in agriculture or forestry, parts, details, or accessories
of agricultural machines or implements, in general"). The subclass is then followed by a 1- to 3digit "group" number, an oblique stroke, and some at least two digits representing a "main
group" ("00") or "subgroup". To measure exploratory innovation, we used the count of a firm's
new technology class. Specifically, a technology subclass is considered as new if it is present in
the firm's patent stocks in the observation year but absent during the preceding five years (Guan
& Liu 2016).
4.2.2 Independent Variables

CEO Network Centrality. We used closeness centrality to measure CEO network
centrality. Closeness was calculated as the reciprocal of the sum of the length of the shortest
paths between the ego and other contacts in the network, which reflects how efficiently and
effectively an ego can obtain information from its alters (Bavelas, 1950; Marchiori & Latora,
2000). The formula for closeness centrality is:
𝑛−1

𝐶𝑖 = ∑

𝑗 𝑑𝑖𝑗

𝑛

× , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁;
𝑁

where 𝐶𝑖 is the closeness centrality, 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the shortest distance between CEO i and
contact j, n is the size of component i belongs to, and N is the size of the entire yearly network.
Closeness centralities capture the overall amount of network-embedded resources that a CEO can
access, as well as the efficiency of obtaining information from the CEO's social connections.
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Consistent with prior studies that use the BoardEx database, social connections of a CEO include
all top executives and directors who have connections to the CEOs through education,
employment, and other activities (Faleye, Kovacs, & Venkateswaran, 2014; Ferris, Javakhadze,
& Rajkovic, 2019). For example, an individual is considered to have a connection with a CEO if
they attend the same university, or they work at the same employer and their tenure overlaps, or
they both serve on the same board of companies, professional associations, and non-profit
organizations.
CEO Structural Holes. The degree of CEO structural holes was measured with the
inverse of Burt's constraint. Burt's constraint indicates the extent to which an ego's time and
energy are concentrated in a single group of interconnected alters (Burt, 1992; Buskens & Van
de Rijt, 2008). As such, the higher the constraint index, the fewer structural holes the focal CEO
spans. Thus, we used the natural log of the inverse of network constraint to measure the degree
of structural holes. The formula for the degree of structural holes is:
𝐻𝑖 = ln

1
,
𝐶𝑖
2

𝐶𝑖 = ∑ (𝑝𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑞 𝑝𝑞𝑗 ) , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑞 ≠ 𝑗
𝑗

𝑞

where 𝐻𝑖 is the degree of structural holes on node i, 𝐶𝑖 is the degree of network constraint on
node i, 𝑝𝑖𝑗 is the proportion of node i's network time and energy spent on contact j, 𝑝𝑖𝑗 =
𝑧𝑖𝑗 / ∑𝑞 𝑧𝑖𝑞 , and variable 𝑧𝑖𝑗 measures the strength of the connection between nodes i and j, so the
contact-specific constraint 𝑐𝑖𝑗 varies from 0 to 1 with the extent to which i's network time and
energy is directly (𝑝𝑖𝑗 ) or indirectly (∑𝑞 𝑝𝑖𝑞 𝑝𝑞𝑗 ) spent on contact j. We took the natural log of the
inverse of network constraint to keep the original proportional relations between constraint and
degree of structural holes.
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4.2.3 Control Variables

We controlled for a comprehensive set of industry-level, firm-level, and CEO-level
covariates. At the CEO level, we controlled for CEO age, gender, tenure, ownership, and duality.
Younger managers are more receptive to new information and may have better innovation
performance than the older ones (Cazier, 2011; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Gender is associated
with risk-taking preference, thereby influencing innovation performance (Faccio, Marchica, &
Mura, 2016). Gender was coded as 1 if a CEO is female and 0 otherwise. Compared to shorter
tenured managers, longer-tenured counterparts have highly firm-specific human capital and may
generate a higher number of innovations (Simsek, 2007). To reduce the potential confounding
influence of tenure, we dropped the observations in the sample for CEOs whose tenure is less
than one year. CEO ownership was measured as the percentage of common shares owned by the
CEOs. CEO ownership has been shown to influence firm risk-taking (Bolton, Mehran, &
Shapiro, 2015). CEO duality was measured as a dichotomized variable that is coded as 1 if a
CEO is chairing the board of directors and 0 otherwise. CEO/Chair duality has been shown to
influence firm risk-taking and innovation decisions (Cannella, Jones, & Withers, 2015; Sahaym
et al., 2016).
At the firm level, we included firm size, performance, M/B ratio, firm slack, R&D
expenditure, and diversification. Firm size was measured as the natural logarithm of total assets,
which is an important antecedent of firm exploration, even though the direction of the
relationship is still under debate (Cohen, 2010; Revilla & Fernández, 2012). Firm performance
was measured using industry-adjusted ROAs for the last three years, and we expect firm
performance to influence innovation volume positively. Firm slack was measured as the annual
working capital ratio (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). Slack resources act as a significant
catalyst for research and innovation (Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003), so firm slack should
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have positive effects on innovation productivity. R&D expenditure reflects the financial
resources a company allocates to research and development and is considered a determinant of
innovation performance (Wu, Levitas, & Priem, 2005). Finally, diversification was measured
with a Herfindahl index (HHI) based on firm sales from different two-digit SIC industry groups.
More diversified firms may have a higher propensity to enter new technological space because of
the heterogeneity of their product-market portfolios.
At the industry level, we controlled for industry munificence, complexity, and dynamism
(Dess & Beard, 1984) because they determine the discretion of managers for strategical decisionmaking under the available resources and opportunities to the firm (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998).
Munificence was measured using five-year average growth in sales and growth in operating
income in each industry (Dess & Beard, 1984). We regressed industry sales or industry operating
income on year and took the antilog of the regression slope coefficient as the indicator for
munificence. Dynamism was measured as the antilog of the standard error of each regression
slope coefficient from this regression (Keats & Hitt, 1988). Complexity was measured based on
an index of dynamic concentration, which is Herfindahl's index of all firms' market share in an
industry in a year.
4.3 Analysis
The final dataset was an unbalanced panel data, and the dependent variable was a nonnegative count. Panel negative binomial or Poisson models are the commonly used regression
models for such data (Cardinal & Hatfield, 2000; Nadkarni & Chen, 2014; Penner-Hahn &
Shaver, 2005). The standard Poisson models assume a variance-to-mean ratio of one, rendering
the results susceptible to under or overdispersion (Wooldridge, 1999; Kaul, 2012). Although a
negative binomial model can be used for overdispersion count data, the estimation procedure

19

used in panel data does not qualify as a true fixed effect (Allison &Waterman, 2002). Thus, we
adopted a quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) Poisson regression model with firm fixed effects,
which is robust against overdispersion and overcomes the drawbacks of conditional fixed effect
negative binomial model (Savage et al., 2020; Kaul, 2012). The firm fixed effects model was
used because it accounts for omitted and non-observable heterogeneities across firms, which can
reduce endogeneity due to such variables. In addition, the Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) on our
data also suggested that random-effects models may be ill-specified, so the fixed-effects model
was preferred.
In our main analysis, a one-year lag was used for control and independent variables. Year
dummies and industry dummies variables were also included. To test the interaction effects
between network centrality and structural holes, we created a first and second-order product term
of closeness centrality and structural holes. Further, we tested the interaction effect between the
two network structural characteristics by using a split-sample approach with a mean-centering of
variables, which was recommended for testing interaction effects in non-linear models (Haans,
Pieters, He, 2016; Nadkarni, Chen, & Chen, 2016). Because the dependent variable exploratory
innovation can only be observed when firms have patents and firms without any patents were
dropped from the sample, there could be potential sample selection bias. Thus, we followed
Heckman's selection correction procedure which is widely used in existing research (Certo,
Busenbark, Woo, & Semadeni, 2016). We estimated the probability of being included in the
sample using a probit model with our main independent variables. Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR)
was generated from the probit and included in all QML Poisson models. Finally, our main
regression model for testing the hypotheses is:

20

ExploratoryInnovationit+1 = α
+ β1 ⋅ Closenessit
+ β2 ⋅ ClosenessSquaredit
+ β3 ⋅ StructuralHolesit
+ β4 ⋅ ClosenessSquaredit ⋅ StructuralHolesit
+ β5 ⋅ Closenessit ⋅ StructuralHolesit
+ β6 ⋅ Σ Controlsit + ηt + γi + λit + εit ,
which predicts the patent count of exploratory innovation classes for firm i in year t+1 as a
function of the independent variables in year t. α is constant, ηt is year dummy variable in year t,
γi is firm i's time-invariant idiosyncratic effect, λit is the inverse Mills ratio of firm i in year t,
and εit is the random error for firm i in year t.
In addition to our main analysis, we conducted several supplementary analyses to test the
robustness of the results. To corroborate our main results from the QML Poisson model, we used
a dynamic panel model because there could be serial correlations in CEO network attributes as
well as exploratory innovation. We also tested the effects of CEO network attributes on
exploitative innovation, which is considered the opposite of exploratory innovation. We also split
the sample between high-tech and low-tech industries to see if our main effects were robust.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
5.1 Main Results from QML Poisson Models
The descriptive summary statistics for the main variables are provided in Table 1.1.1,
including means, standard deviations, minimums, and maximums, and three quartiles. On
average, a sample firm has approximately 14 patents applied each year. An average (median)
CEO has linked directors with a total network of 120 (57) connections. With regard to other
control variables, an average firm has total assets of $2.17 billion, $297 million of R&D inputs,
and an M/B ratio of 3.45.
In Table 1.2.1, correlations for the main variables are provided. We examined variance
inflation factors (VIFs) for all variables, and VIF scores ranged from 1.01 to 1.80 (mean VIF =
1.20), indicating that there is little concern for multicollinearity between predictor variables and
other covariates.
Table 1.3.1 shows results from the fixed effects of QML Poisson regression testing the
effects of the overall network centrality and structural holes. Model 1 includes only control
variables. Model 2 includes the linear effect of network centrality and structural holes. Model 3
includes the curvilinear effect of network centrality, and Model 4 includes the linear effect of
structural holes, the curvilinear effects of network centrality, and the interactional effects
between structural holes and network centrality.
As Table 1.3.1 illustrates, the squared term of network centrality (Closeness Squared) has
a strong negative effect on exploratory innovation (b = -.614, S.E. = .049, p < .001), indicating
an inverted U-shape type of curvilinear main effect of network centrality on exploratory
innovation; therefore, hypothesis 1 is supported. However, the degree of structural holes has no
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main effect on firm exploratory innovation (b = .019, SE = .021, p > .1); thus hypothesis 2 is not
supported. Model 4 includes interaction effects between network centrality (squared) and
structural holes. The linear product term of network centrality (Closeness) and structural holes is
negative and significant (b = -.098, S.E. = .044, p < .05), and the product term of network
centrality squared (Closeness Squared) and structural holes is negative and significant (b = -.127,
S.E. = .040, p < .01), indicating that structural holes reinforce the main inverted U-shape effect
of network centrality. Thus, hypothesis 3 receives support. Note that in the full model, structural
holes have a positive effect on exploratory innovation (b = -.162, S.E. = .059, p < .01), indicating
that the effects of structural holes are contingent upon network centrality. Further, in the splitsample analyses, the results of Model 6 and Model 8 show that closeness and closeness squared
are both statistically significant in the two subsamples of more or less structural holes,
suggesting that network centrality exhibits the inverted U-shape effect on exploratory innovation
both when a CEO has more and less structural holes in his or her social network; therefore,
hypothesis 3 receives further support.
To probe further into the interaction effect between network centrality and structural
holes, we plotted the margin effects in Figure 1.1.1, which shows that the network centrality has
an inverted U-shape relationship with firm exploratory innovation. The figure shows that the
turning point of the inverted-U curve is at the position of – 1.34 SD. Specifically, network
centrality has a relatively weak positive curvilinear relationship with exploratory innovation
when it increases from -2 standard deviations to the -1.5 standard deviations, and the analysis of
the marginal effects suggested that the expected number of exploratory innovation would
increase by 10.28 % under a high degree of structural holes, 8.88 % under an average degree of
structural holes, and 7.15 % under a low degree of structural holes respectively. However, the
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effect of overall network centrality would increasingly negative when it continues to increase,
and the analysis of the marginal effects suggests that the expected number of exploratory
innovations decreases by 137.84 % under a high degree of structural holes, 137.38 % under an
average degree of structural holes, and 136.78 % under a low degree of structural holes
respectively given a one standard deviation increase in network centrality from the mean value.
Consistent with H3, we thus can see that when CEOs occupy a higher level of centrality in the
network, the worsening effect of structural holes on exploratory innovation is quite significant.
The inverted-U curve is highly skewed to the right. One possible reason for the skewness is the
range restriction of CEO network centrality. Our sample of CEOs are from large and visible
firms with patents, and such groups of CEOs are more likely to be deeply embedded in the top
executives' and directors' networks.
We further plotted the main effects of structural roles depending on varying levels of
network centrality, which can be seen in Figure 1.2.1. The expected number of exploratory
innovations would increase by 14.10 % and 12.36 % respectively when the degree of structural
holes increases every one standard deviation from the level of -1 SD to +1 S.D. under the
scenario of low closeness centrality. However, the increasing trend would diminish to negative
as the level of closeness centrality continuously increases, which shows in the scenario of high
closeness centrality that the expected number of exploratory innovations would conversely
decrease by 17.15% and 14.64% when the degree of structural holes increases every one
standard deviation from the level of -1 SD to 0 and +1 S.D. The moderation effect of network
centrality is a reason for the insignificant main effects of structural holes on exploration
innovation.
To summarize, the results show that our hypotheses receive general support. We
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hypothesized an inverted U-shape main effect of network centrality on exploratory innovation,
and the results found that network centrality does present such a curvilinear effect. Our
interaction hypothesis also receives support. The results in the split samples show that the
number of structural holes in the CEO networks significantly moderates the curvilinear effects of
network centrality on exploratory innovation. When a CEO has more (or less) structural holes in
the network, the inverted U-shape effect of network centrality becomes more (or less) prominent,
and the peak amount of exploratory innovation occurs at a higher (or lower) level. We did not
find a main effect of structural holes on exploratory innovation, and it is possibly due to the
moderation effect of network centrality.
5.2 Robustness Check
We conducted three sets of robustness tests. First, we used a dynamic panel model to see
if the results were consistent with the primary results from the QML Poisson model. Although
fixed-effects panel data models have been widely used in management studies (Becerra,
Markarian, & Santalo, 2020; Love, Roger & Vahter, 2014), the presence of a lagged dependent
variable among the regressors could be highly influential in the dynamic relationships (Li, Ding,
Hu, & Wan, 2021; Ting, 2016). The fixed effects regression model is very susceptible to bias
when the independent variables and dependent variables are affected by the past values of the
dependent variable. Indeed, the number of exploratory innovations in the preceding year was
strongly correlated with its current value (r = 0.71) in our study. We therefore tested and with a
dynamic panel data (DPD) regression model by leveraging the first and second lag value of
independent and dependent variables as instruments. Concerning the count nature of our
dependent variable, we ran an exponential feedback model (EFM) in the count dynamic panel
data regression (CDPD) (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013) and received consistent results for all three
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hypotheses. The results of dynamic panel models are reported in Table 1.4.1.
Second, we used exploitative innovation as an alternative dependent variable to further
corroborate our main results on exploratory innovation. Exploitative innovation is often
considered the opposite of exploratory innovation, although it may not be exactly orthogonal.
Thus, when using exploitative innovation as the dependent variable, we should expect to see the
opposite effects of CEO network attributes. To measure exploitative innovation, we used the
number of repeated backward citations in a firm's patent stock. When a firm repeatedly cites the
same prior arts in its patents, it indicates that the firm is exploiting its existing repertoire of
knowledge (Benner & Tushman, 2002; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). We replicated the exact same
fixed-effects models using exploitative innovation as the dependent variable, and the results are
presented in the Table 1.5.1.
Meanwhile, we also plotted the main effects of network centrality on exploitative
innovation depending on varying levels of structural roles as shown from Figure 1.3.1, CEO
network centrality has a U-shape relationship with exploitative innovation, while CEO structural
holes do not show any effects. As expected, the relationship between CEO network centrality
and exploitative innovation mirrors the relationship on exploratory innovation (inverted Ushape). Taken together, we gain a complete picture of the effect of CEO network centrality. As
CEO network centrality increases from low degrees, a firm produces more exploratory
innovation and less exploitative innovation; however, when centrality passes a certain threshold,
a firm reverts its innovation trajectory by emphasizing exploitative innovation.
In our final robustness test, we split the same into high-technology and non-high
technology industries to see if the results remain robust. The number of patent applications and
grants is not evenly distributed across all industries; instead, it is highly concentrated in the high-
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technology industries. Thus, our main results could be driven by the patents in a few hightechnology industries. We split samples into high technology or non-high technology class based
on NAICS 4 codes that constitute high-technology industries (Science and Engineering
Indicators, 2014) and high-tech classifications developed by the Center for Economic
Development (CED) and State Science & Technology Institute (SSTI) in 2004. For example,
"2111" represents "Oil and Gas Extraction," which belongs to the high-tech class; while "0003"
is "Lumber and wood products," which belongs to the non-high-tech class even if they also have
some patent applications. Regression results in Table 1.6.1 show that the main effects from CEO
network centrality and structural holes on exploratory innovation are both important in high tech
industries, while the effect from structural holes on exploratory innovation is insignificant in
non-high-tech industries.
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CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
We set out to examine the effects of structural embeddedness and structural holes of CEO
social networks on a firm's exploratory innovation outcomes. Overall, we found that the network
centrality of CEOs has an inverted U-shape relationship with the exploratory innovation
outcomes. Interestingly, the turning point of our theoretical curvilinear hypothesis is statistically
negative based on our sample selection, which seems to be less persuasive than a linear negative
relationship between network centrality and exploratory innovation. But we argue that this
doesn’t negate our hypothetical claim. The inverted U-shape curve is highly skewed towards the
declining side, indicating that increasing network centrality predominantly inhibits exploratory
innovation rather than stimulating it. Our sample of CEOs are from large and significant firms
with reputations, and such groups of CEOs are more likely to be positionally dominant in their
social networks than other ordinary counterparts. Regarding the degree of structural holes, we
found that it generally increases exploratory innovation, and such a positive effect is more
prominent when network centrality is at low levels and turns into negative once network
centrality goes up. Our findings have important implications for research on innovation
management and strategic leadership.
6.1 Research Implications
Our findings greatly extend the current research on CEOs' social capital and
technological innovation. Scholars have long recognized that a CEO's social capital can be an
important source of innovation capabilities (Cao, Maruping, & Takeuchi, 2006; Colloins &
Clark, 2003; Katila & Ahuja, 2002). Some scholars called for the research to expand the
generalizability using a more comprehensive structural analysis with a longitudinal design that
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accounts for the intrinsically embedded nature of knowledge and information among CEO
networks (Cao, Simsek, & Jansen, 2015). However, empirical evidence is still sparse. By
investigating two of the most fundamental structural attributes (structural embeddedness and
structural holes) of CEO social networks, we show that such structural attributes exhibit
multifaceted and somewhat counter-intuitive influence over innovation.
Our results regarding the curvilinear effects of network centrality indicate that there are
countervailing forces of structural embeddedness. Although highly embedded CEOs can access
more network-embedded information and resources, such benefits do come with some costs. Our
findings show that only a low degree of network centrality can positively impact exploratory
innovation, and such positive effect turns into negative once centrality reaches moderate degrees.
The curvilinear effects of network centrality are consistent with a prior study that examines the
influence of CEO social capital and firm entrepreneurial orientation (Cao et al., 2015). Yet
another prior study shows that CEO network centrality has mainly positive effect on merger and
acquisition performance (El-Khatib, et al., 2015). It seems that the effects of CEO network
centrality are contingent upon the specific context and outcomes. In the context of exploratory
innovation, the costs of high embeddedness can outweigh the benefits, which may not be
necessarily the same in the merger and acquisitions context. Thus, we recommend future
research that investigates the structural embeddedness of CEOs should consider the
countervailing forces in specific contexts and theorize how the benefits and costs interact with
each other to jointly determine the firm outcomes.
Our results on the interaction between structural holes and network centrality also extend
current research. Structural holes show a positive main effect on exploratory innovation, which
largely corroborate the findings from a prior study that also shows a positive effect of CEO
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bridging social capital and a firm's entrepreneurial orientation (Cao, et al. 2015). Yet, no existing
studies have investigated the boundary conditions of structural holes and the interaction effects
of structural holes and network centrality. Network centrality and structural holes reflect
different dimensions of structural embeddedness. In our case, network centrality reflects the
overall degree of embeddedness of a CEO, and the degree of structural holes indicates whether
the CEO is embedded in a dense network or a sparse network. Interestingly, our finding shows
that the benefits of structural holes decrease as a CEO's network centrality increases. Therefore,
to be most effective in exploratory innovation, CEOs need to be moderately embedded in a
sparse network with some structural holes. When CEOs are deeply embedded in a sparse
network, the abundance of structural holes does not bring any benefits but may actually inhibit
exploratory innovation.
Overall, our study offers important research implications for future research on the social
capital of CEOs. Note that we focus on technological innovation, so the exact effects of network
centrality and structural holes may not be generalizable to other contexts. However, when future
research theorizes and investigates structural attributes, scholars should take into consideration
the countervailing forces of different structural attributes, and boundary conditions of their
influence, and the interactions between them.
6.2 Practical Implications
Business practitioners always advocate that well-performed CEOs should be wellconnected in their social networks because it is argued that this would be more influential in the
aggregation of information and knowledge and the implementation of innovation initiatives.
However, our findings challenge this conventional wisdom. When CEOs are over-embedded in
their social networks, redundant information and shared mental maps in the network may
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disproportionately set back the improvement course of firm innovation activities. Moreover, with
the costly nature of structural holes, the side effects could be even worse. Therefore, CEOs
should be aware of their unique roles in the social networks; excess social networking could
harm the decision-making efficiency and the firm innovation performance and take some actions
to avoid such endangerments. For instance, when initiating new innovative projects, managers
might need to pay more attention to their business acumen to simplify the decision process and
make sure that neither a common framework of reference dominates team decisions nor
conflicting new insights and information delays the right decision timing.
6.3 Future Research
We encourage future research to address the limitations of our study. First, it is
worthwhile to have more studies to investigate the dynamics between CEO social networks and
the effects on exploratory innovation. Theoretically, a CEO's social network should capture all of
his or her social connections with other individuals, organizations, groups of interest that include
colleagues, subordinates, customers, suppliers, competitors, and third-party service providers
(Cao, Simsek, & Jansen, 2015). Although the CEO social network consisting of professional and
directorial contacts that are collected in our sample is an integral component for the firm
strategic exploratory innovation, the associations between CEOs and many other stakeholders
might also function as a source of knowledge and information that assists technological
innovation.
Second, we encourage future research to investigate other important structural
characteristics (i.e., density, network efficiency, etc.) and situated moderators (i.e., absorptive
capacity, innovative climate, etc.). For instance, we can understand social networks by the level
of interconnectedness, quality and nature of these ties, and extent of common shared vision
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(Akram et al., 2016), thereby obtaining more nuanced insights on the differential effects of
diverse characteristics of CEO social networks. Further, depending on the specific task and
contextual factors, the effects generated from CEO social network structures might vary
differently. One particularly important contextual factor is the temporal dimension. Social
network structures may change depending on how long a CEO worked in the specific firm or
industry. Newly assumed CEOs that are only short-lived may be affected more by salient
powerful stakeholders as opposed to a less-powerful board of directors. Therefore, greater
insightful perspectives along this research stream are significantly needed.
Finally, using patent classification-based measures for exploratory innovation may not
capture all aspects of exploration activities of firms in the R&D services industry even though it's
a common practice in innovation research (Fosfuri, Giarratana, & Luzzi, 2008; Rothaermel &
Thursby, 2005). The proxy for patent classification only allows us to capture several facets of the
innovation. For instance, the USPTO has been relaxing the restrictive rules toward granting
computer software patents (Bessen & Hunt, 2007) without any requirements for appliers to
disclose detailed descriptions of the mechanisms as before. As a result, software patents have
experienced rapid growth in numbers, but it's hard to identify the exploratory innovation to the
full extent. Thus, alternative innovation indicators for robustness checks are strongly encouraged
as well.
6.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, our study extends CEO networks analysis into innovation research. In
particular, we show that two important network structure characteristics - network centrality and
structural holes - altered the dynamics of exploratory innovation. Network centrality exhibits an
inverted U-shape relationship, theoretically, while structural holes have positive linear
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relationships with corporate exploratory innovation, and the latter can reinforce the former
curvilinear effect. The empirical results basically verify the hypotheses, suggesting that overhigh CEO network centrality is destructive to firm exploratory innovation and that benefits of
structural holes will diminish to extinction as CEOs have increasingly growing network
centrality. Our study offers significant research implications on innovation and social networks
literature as well as important managerial implications for business practices.
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TABLE1.1.1 Summary Statistics
Variables

Min

p25

Mean

Median

p75

Max

SD

1

26

118.289

57

133

967

170.590

0.454

1.039

1.209

1.270

1.392

2.044

0.400

Structural Holes

0

1.676

2.220

2.232

2.741

4.377

.819

Exploratory Innovation

0

2

14.188

6

16

137

23.121

Env. Complexity

.042

.111

.250

.195

.320

.995

.199

Env. Munificence

-.179

.019

.057

.051

.090

.307

.078

.003

.014

.033

.025

.039

.160

.031

0

12.244

297.443

50.283

172.985

5682

824.087

Firm Size

.140

.979

2.153

1.943

3.135

5.756

1.386

Firm Slack

.346

1.069

2.300

1.616

2.648

12.707

2.064

-11.086

1.617

3.465

2.465

3.921

36.049

4.909

-.592

.013

.034

.053

.091

.274

.122

0

.693

1.197

1.213

1.632

3.180

.699

39

51

55.090

55

60

72

6.665

CEO Gender

0

0

.025

0

0

1

.155

CEO Duality

0

1

.889

1

1

1

.315

CEO Tenure

1.252

5.049

10.048

8.589

12.836

37.321

6.983

.000

0

1.030

0

0.658

21.457

3.043

Degree
Closeness

Env. Dynamism
R&D Expense

M/B ratio
Firm Performance
HHI
CEO Age

CEO Ownership

Notes. This table reports the summary statistics for variables used in the empirical analysis. The sample includes 7,
543 firm-year observations between 2000 and 2014. Network measures are nonlogarithmic terms here for easy
interpretation. Degree, Closeness, and Structural Holes are weighted measures. To facilitate observation, Closeness
is multiple by 1.0e+09. Exploratory innovation is from year t + 1, and all other variables are from year t. Env. is
short for the environment.

47

TABLE 1.2.1 Correlation Matrix
Variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

1

Closeness

2

Structural Holes

0.180*

3

Exploratory
Innovation

-0.005

0.051*

4

Env. Complexity

0.038*

-0.005

0.071*

5

Env. Munificence

-0.066*

-0.028*

0.018

-0.111*

6

Env. Dynamism

-0.170*

-0.047*

-0.055*

0.054*

0.272*

7

R&D Expense

0.091*

0.057*

0.517*

-0.066*

0.027*

-0.083*

8

Firm Size

0.090*

0.082*

0.528*

0.131*

-0.024*

-0.099*

0.428*

9

Firm Slack

-0.046*

-0.049*

-0.155*

-0.162*

0.033*

0.050*

-0.076*

-0.481*

10

M/B Ratio

0.042*

0.016

0.032*

-0.006

0.033*

-0.026*

0.053*

0.017

-0.007

11

Firm Performance

0.055*

0.006

0.103*

0.028*

0.007

-0.075*

0.074*

0.176*

-0.044*

0.153*

12

HHI

0.053*

0.027*

0.216*

0.049*

-0.020

-0.022

-0.022

0.218*

-0.101*

0.012

0.030*

13

CEO Age

0.022

-0.012

0.060*

0.041*

-0.027*

0.002

0.032*

0.148*

-0.078*

-0.035*

0.035*

14

CEO Gender

0.015

0.037*

0.039*

0.041*

-0.010

-0.012

0.043*

0.042*

-0.009

0.016

0.029*

0.013

-0.040*

15

CEO Duality

-0.024*

0.013

0.036*

0.007

-0.015

0.027*

-0.040*

0.068*

-0.055*

-0.015

0.039*

-0.001

0.050*

0.009

16

CEO Tenure

-0.124*

0.061*

-0.026*

-0.065*

0.051*

0.002

-0.034*

-0.104*

0.174*

0.009

0.052*

-0.073*

0.301*

-0.053*

0.036*

17

CEO Ownership

0.070*

0.033*

-0.065*

-0.033*

-0.002

-0.121*

0.019

-0.144*

0.097*

0.030*

0.033*

-0.054*

0.065*

0.019*

-0.055*

N = 7,543, * p < 0.05
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(16)

-0.014

0.317*

TABLE 1.3.1 Fixed-Effects Poisson (QML) Regression Model Predicting Exploratory
Innovation
Full Sample

Variables
Model 1

Split Sample
More Structural Holes
Less Structural Holes
Model 5
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

-0.291***
(0.054)
0.056**
(0.020)

-0.722***
(0.058)
0.019
(0.021)

-0.442***
(0.115)
0.162**
(0.059)

-0.771***
(0.083)

-0.687***
(0.104)

-0.614***
(0.049)

-0.303**
(0.108)

-0.701***
(0.078)

-0.580***
(0.067)

Direct Effects
Closeness
Structural Holes
Inverted U Effect
Closeness Squared
Interactions
Closeness ×
Structural Holes

-0.098*
(0.044)

Closeness Squared ×
Structural Holes
Control Variables

-0.127**
(0.040)
-0.112
(0.282)
0.084
(0.197)
0.871†
(0.525)
0.000
(0.000)
0.227***
(0.069)
0.009
(0.011)
0.003
(0.003)
0.376**
(0.140)
-0.020
(0.021)
-0.969***
(0.177)

-0.151
(0.278)
0.093
(0.196)
0.787
(0.536)
0.000
(0.000)
0.262***
(0.069)
0.010
(0.011)
0.003
(0.003)
0.381**
(0.137)
-0.023
(0.020)
-0.914***
(0.180)

-0.083
(0.287)
0.031
(0.191)
0.001
(0.527)
0.000
(0.000)
0.270***
(0.070)
0.009
(0.011)
0.004†
(0.003)
0.394**
(0.141)
-0.028
(0.020)
-0.262
(0.158)

-0.107
(-0.287)
0.003
(0.192)
0.052
(0.523)
0.000
(0.000)
0.272***
(0.069)
0.010
(0.010)
0.004†
(0.003)
0.382**
(0.137)
-0.029
(0.020)
-0.289
(0.157)

-0.265
(0.375)
0.234
(0.294)
1.216†
(0.685)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.209*
(0.089)
0.016
(0.017)
0.001
(0.004)
0.213
(0.204)
-0.049†
(0.027)
-1.271***
(0.296)

-0.190
(0.382)
0.188
(0.268)
0.098
(0.626)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.224*
(0.087)
0.018
(0.016)
0.004
(0.004)
0.242
(0.205)
-0.064*
(0.027)
-0.188
(0.288)

-0.435
(0.390)
0.247
(0.301)
0.082
(0.781)
0.000
(0.000)
0.214*
(0.109)
0.011
(0.015)
0.003
(0.003)
0.347†
(0.193)
0.004
(0.034)
-0.885***
(0.236)

-0.396
(0.393)
0.229
(0.304)
-0.690
(0.766)
0.000†
(0.000)
0.237**
(0.109)
0.010
(0.015)
0.003
(0.003)
0.374†
(0.194)
-0.003
(0.033)
-0.193
(0.239)

-0.001
(0.004)
0.020
(0.125)
-0.004
(0.047)
-0.000
(0.003)
0.012
(0.007)

-0.000
(0.004)
0.036
(0.128)
-0.004
(0.049)
-0.001
(0.003)
0.011
(0.008)

-0.000
(0.003)
0.083
(0.123)
-0.014
(0.048)
-0.001
(0.003)
0.009
(0.007)

-0.000
(0.003)
0.107
(0.124)
-0.015
(0.047)
-0.001
(0.004)
0.010
(0.007)

-0.008
(0.005)
0.041
(0.138)
-0.070
(0.048)
0.002
(0.005)
0.009†
(0.005)

-0.005
(0.005)
0.119
(0.123)
-0.071
(0.046)
0.001
(0.005)
0.007
(0.005)

-0.000
(0.005)
0.039
(0.182)
-0.015
(0.077)
0.005
(0.006)
0.015
(0.011)

0.001
(0.005)
0.084
(0.164)
-0.028
(0.077)
0.004
(0.006)
0.011
(0.004)

Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

# of Observations

6,571

6,571

6,571

6,571

3,206

3,206

3,179

3,179

Env. Complexity
Env. Munificence
Env. Dynamism
R&D Expense
Firm Size
Firm Slack
M/B Ratio
Firm Performance
HHI
IMR
CEO Age
CEO Gender
CEO Duality
CEO Tenure
CEO Ownership

# of Firms

849

849

849

849

551

551

548

548

Log likelihood

-24,538.87

-24,368.45

-23,821.42

-23,780.20

-11,562.61

-11,053.96

-10,575.80

-10,376.51

Wald Chi2

190.70***

212.63***

365.03***

354.37***

119.31***

283.78***

92.96***

182.31***

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. To facilitate observation, Closeness is multiple by
1.0e+09 and Closeness Squared is a mean-centered metric. Env. is short for the environment. IMR is the inverse mills ratio.
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TABLE 1.4.1 Count Dynamic Panel Model (EFM) Regression
Exploratory
Innovation

Variables
Direct Effects

-0.689***
(0.091)
0.083*
(0.038)

Closeness
Structural Holes
Inverted U Effect

-0.481***
(0.084)

Closeness Squared
Interactions
Closeness ×
Structural Holes

0.014
(0.032)

Closeness Squared ×
Structural Holes

-0.069*
(0.030)
0.004***
(0.000)
-0.729***
(0.201)
0.525***
(0.124)
-0.139
(0.297)
-0.000
(0.000)
0.036
(0.066)
0.013
(0.019)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.032
(0.146)

L. Exploratory Innovation
Env. Complexity
Env. Munificence
Env. Dynamism
R&D Expense
Firm Size
Firm Slack
M/B Ratio
Firm Performance

0.006*
(0.003)

CEO Age
CEO Gender

0.633***
(0.103)

CEO Duality

0.165***
(0.039)

CEO Tenure

-0.011*
(0.004)
-0.021***
(0.006)

CEO Ownership

-0.058***
(0.014)
0.163†
(0.089)

HHI
IMR
Year Fixed Effects

Included

# of Observations

4,027

# of Instruments

32
234.557
(p = 0.1085)

Hansen’s J Test

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. To facilitate observation, Closeness is multiple by
1.0e+09 and Closeness Squared is a mean-centered metric. Env. is short for the environment; EFM stands for the exponential feedback model in the
count dynamic panel data regression, which is used for dealing with a potential large ratio of zero observations. L.D. and D mean the lag of and the
first-order difference for corresponding variables respectively since Count Dynamic Panel Model estimates parameters on the differenced regressors.
IMR is the inverse mills ratio.
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TABLE 1.5.1 Fixed-Effects Regression Model Predicting Exploitative Innovation
Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

0.024*
(0.012)
0.006
(0.005)

0.066***
(0.015)
0.008
(0.005)

0.065*
(0.032)
0.006
(0.016)

0.064***
(0.013)

0.053†
(0.108)

Direct Effects
Closeness
Structural Holes
Inverted U Effect
Closeness Squared
Interactions
Closeness ×
Structural Holes

-0.000
(0.012)

Closeness Squared ×
Structural Holes

0.005
(0.012)

Control Variables

Included

Included

Included

Included

Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

# of Observations

7,543

7,543

7,543

7,543

# of Firms

1,082

1,082

1,082

1,082

2,969.15

2,974.62

2,991.76

2,992.05

0.0762

0.0775

0.0817

0.0818

Log likelihood
Within R-squared

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. To
facilitate observation, Closeness is multiple by 1.0e+09 and Closeness Squared is a mean-centered
metric. Env. is short for the environment. IMR is the inverse mills ratio.
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TABLE 1.6.1 Additional Analysis
Variables

Model 1

High-tech
Model 2
Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Non-high tech
Model 6
Model 7

Model 8

-0.253**
(0.092)
0.015
(0.030)

-0.677***
(0.095)
-0.026
(0.030)

-0.293†
(0.177)
0.178†
(0.096)

-0.597***
(0.079)

-0.202
(0.167)

Direct Effects
-0.338***
(0.060)
0.087***
(0.023)

Closeness
Structural Holes

-0.766***
(0.070)
0.051*
(0.024)

-0.586***
(0.135)
0.138*
(0.069)

-0.621***
(0.064)

-0.392***
(0.126)

Inverted U Effect
Closeness Squared
Interactions
Closeness ×
Structural Holes

-0.056
(0.051)

-0.144*
(0.066)

Closeness Squared ×
Structural Holes

-0.097†
(0.050)

-0.158*
(0.064)

Control Variables

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

Included

IMR

-0.816***
(0.201)

-0.755***
(0.197)

-0.179
(0.192)

-0.191
(0.188)

-1.305***
(0.341)

-1.193***
(0.353)

-0.402
(0.276)

-0.461
(0.284)

Year Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Firm Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

# of Observations

3,891

3,891

3,891

3,891

2,680

2,680

2,680

2,680

485

485

485

485

364

364

364

364

Log likelihood

-14,428.25

-14,281.26

-13,963.33

-13,950.25

-9,915.05

-9,866.58

-9,651.52

-9,625.08

Wald Chi2

186.72***

253.90***

309.79***

310.25***

69.18***

69.39***

173.93***

170.63***

# of Firms

*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. To facilitate observation,
Closeness is multiple by 1.0e+09 and Closeness Squared is a mean-centered metric. Env. is short for the environment.
IMR is the inverse mills ratio.
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FIGURE 1.1.1 Interaction Effect of Structural Holes on the Relationship between CEO Network
Closeness Centrality and Exploratory Innovation
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FIGURE 1.2.1 Interaction Effect of CEO Network Closeness Centrality on the Relationship
between Structural Holes and Exploratory Innovation
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FIGURE 1.3.1 Interaction Effect of Structural Holes on the Relationship between CEO Network
Closeness Centrality and Exploitative Innovation
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EFFECTS OF CEO SOCIAL NETWORKS ON PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS IN THE
TEMPORAL TRANSITIONS BETWEEN EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION

ABSTRACT
Building on prior research showing that firm may need to adapt to change by
ambidextrously adjusting between exploration and exploitation and a sudden leap between them
could have a significant impact on performance, this study attempts to further disentangle the
performance implications of a temporal transition. Integrating social network perspective and
upper echelon theory, besides, we theorize and empirically test CEO social networks factors as
boundary conditions on performance implications of temporal transitions between exploration
and exploitation. Our findings indicate that a significant and compact leap from exploitation to
exploration has a detrimental effect while a significant and compact leap from exploration to
exploitation has a beneficial effect on performance, and that CEO social network structural holes
tend to mitigate the former performance deterioration effects whereas to reinforce the latter
performance augmentation effects. Our paper highlights the importance of CEO social network
in a temporal transition context.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
It is well established in the strategy and organization learning literature that firms well
handling the issue of organizational ambidexterity via appropriately altering exploitation and
exploration as needed can not only increase firm adaptability, but also achieve sustainable
competitive advantages (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; March, 1991, 1996, 2006; Mudambi &
Swift, 2014; Swift, 2016). However, there have still been in disputes upon how firms balance or
alternate between exploration and exploitation and how such changes affect firm performance.
One of the most discussed approaches in the literature is a temporal transition (Gupta, Smith, &
Shalley, 2006; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; Raisch & Tushman, 2016; Tushman & O'Reilly,
1996; Zimmermann, Raisch, & Birkinshaw, 2015), which indicates that firms alter exploration
and exploitation as necessary over time (Brown &Eisenhardt, 1997; Nickerson, Nickerson &
Zenger, 2002). Recent studies suggest that a temporal transition has a mixed impact on the firm
performance (Burgelman, 2002; Gupta et al., 2006; Kang & Kim, 2020; Mudambi & Swift,
2014; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994; Swift, 2016). Scholars who support positive performance
implications believe that firms have ability to simultaneously pursue exploration and exploitation
by clinging to diverging objectives at different times (Cyber & March, 1963; Kang & Kim, 2020;
Levinthal & March, 1993), whereas those who hold negative performance implications believe
that firms are immensely challenged by rotating between contrary and conflicting routines and
abilities for exploration vs exploitation (Kang & Kim, 2020; Lee & Puranam, 2016; Posen &
Posen & Levinthal, 2012).
Despite the conflicting performance implications of temporal transitions between
exploration and exploitation forwarding our understanding of how firms engage in the
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ambidexterity, we argue it may be oversimplified and biased to consider them as positive or
negative that is mutually exclusive. Moreover, research on a temporal transition remains largely
dependent research streams on the firm level of analysis. The imperative to call for further
research on ambidexterity from network analysis of leaders and managers has been demonstrated
by the literature (Stadler, Rajwani, & Karaba, 2014). The increasingly growing upper echelon
and social network research lines might, as a result, shed some more light on the potential
research in the temporal transitions. In this study, we attempt to graft them, improve
understanding about further performance effects contingent on their intrinsic characteristics and
CEO social networks via addressing research questions: What exactly is the performance impact
of a temporal transition? What is the role of CEO social networks in performance implications in
the temporal transition? Does it vary in performance effects on the temporal transitions?
As reflected in the aforementioned distinctive performance implications of temporal
transition views, we address this issue by explicating and distinguishing the two types of
temporal transitions (i.e., a leap from exploration to exploitation vs. a leap from exploitation to
exploration) based on their intrinsic differences in directionality. More precisely, by
disentangling the differences between exploration and exploitation literature, we predict that the
performance impact from a significant and compact leap from exploration to exploitation is
different from the performance impact from a significant and compact leap back. Besides, we
also probe in the potential role of CEO social networks playing as a boundary condition under
the context of the performance implications of temporal transitions. We test our predictions on
unbalanced panel data consisting of 4,164 observations of US S&P 1500 firms from 2000 to
2014, and find that a significant and compact leap from exploitation to exploration is negative
towards firm performance while a significant and compact leap from exploration to exploitation
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is positive towards firm performance, and also that structural holes of CEO social networks
dramatically affect the capacity of firm to shift between exploitation and exploration and come
into the distinct performance implications of temporal transitions between exploration and
exploitation. In particular, the negative performance effects of a significant and compact leap
from exploitation to exploration become less pronounced, while the positive performance effects
of a significant and compact leap from exploration to exploitation become more pronounced, for
the firm with a higher level of CEO social network structural holes.
One primary contribution arising from our study is that a CEO level of analysis should be
included to consider their important roles under the context of temporal transitions between
exploration and exploitation. Prior research on a temporal transition remains largely dependent
research streams on the firm level of analysis, few has looked at CEOs who play the most
important roles during temporal transitions. In addition, we also contribute to the ambidexterity
research by furthering the understanding of the complexity of the performance implications in
temporal transitions. Different than prior research’s emphasis on competitive advantage and
organizational inertia, we elucidate the differential impacts of temporal transitions on
performance based on their ambidextrously intrinsic heterogeneities. Third, our study makes
some implications for strategic leadership research since social networks of CEOs have been
understudied and extant studies basically looked at personal factors such as demographics and
personality traits or cognitive biases. Last but not the least, our study first investigates social
networks of CEOs as a contextual factor in the temporal transitions’ literature. The recent stream
of strategy research has emphasized the consequences of CEO social networks as determinants
and constraints of strategic decisions (Adams & Ragunathan, 2017; Brown, Gao, Lee, &
Stathopoulos, 2012; Cao, Simsek, & Jansen, 2015; El-Khatib, Fogel, & Jandik, 2015; Faleye,
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Kovacs, & Venkateswaran, 2014; Griffin, Hong, Liu, & Ryou, 2021; McDonald, Khanna, &
Westphal, 2008; Shue, 2013). Despite perceiving the potential role of CEO social networks in
exploration and exploitation, the ambidexterity literature has not considered how the specific
structural and relational characteristics of CEO social networks may exert differentiated effects
on the ability of firms to reach the ambidextrous goal. In this study, we therefore explain why
CEO social network centrality and structural holes impose particular significant boundaries on a
firm’s ability to rotate between exploration and exploitation and then add some insights on CEO
social networks in the strategy literature to the ambidexterity literature.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Temporal Transition between Exploration and Exploitation
Despite the fact that organizational ambidexterity has been consistently studied by a great
deal of scholars (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; March, 1991, 1996, 2006; Mudambi & Swift, 2014;
Swift, 2016), there has been a debate about how to well deal with the ambidexterity issue. There
are two most widely discussed approaches in the literature are balancing and a temporal
transition (Gupta, Smith, &Shalley, 2006; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; Raisch & Tushman,
2016; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996; Zimmermann, Raisch, & Birkinshaw, 2015). The balancing
approach proposes that firms perform exploration and exploitation simultaneously (Gupta et al.,
2006; Raisch, Birkinshaw, Probst, & Tushman, 2009). Firms are able to strike the organizational
balance in ambidexterity structurally, behaviorally, and systematically (Stadler, Rajwani, &
Karaba, 2014). For example, Strategic business units (Gupta et al., 2006; Lavie, Stettner, &
Tushman, 2010; Simsek, 2009), external partners (Hill & Birkinshaw, 2008; Lavie & Rosenkopf,
2006; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004), and top management coordination (Andriopoulos & Lewis,
2009; Mom, Van Den Bosch, & Volberta. 2007, 2009; Smith & Tushman, 2005) can be taken by
high-performing organizations to allocate resources in a consistent way to create conditions
under which balance can be viable for effective long-term survival (Stadler et al., 2014). While
the temporal transition approach indicates that firms alter exploration and exploitation as
necessary over time (Brown &Eisenhardt, 1997; Nickerson, Nickerson & Zenger, 2002).
Resources constraints as the primary concern for firms to achieve the ambidextrous goal results
in a trade-off situation instead. Firms face a choice of exploratory or exploitative activities to
invest in. If they decide to invest heavily in exploitation, they have fewer resources available for
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exploration and vice versa. Advocates for a temporal transition solution hold the notion,
therefore, that firms can direct more resources towards exploitation when they need to
commercialize in the short term while redirecting more resources towards exploration when they
need to promote technological advantages; this discretionary behavior of temporal transition
between exploration and exploitation may dramatically alleviate the trade-off situation. In fact,
some empirical studies have provided relevant evidence that parallel with the temporal transition
claim (Kang & Kim, 2020; Mudambi & Swift, 2014; Swift, 2016). For example, Swift (2016)
found that firms on average can benefit from executing the sequential transitioning strategy
between exploration and exploitation.
2.2 Conflicting Performance Implications
Temporal separation suggests that firms become organizationally ambidextrous by
alternating between exploration and exploitation (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Kang, Kang, &
Kim, 2017; Kang & Kim, 2020; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). The
literature indicates that firm performance is subject to the sequential leaps between exploration
and exploitation taken by firms. One group of scholars support that performance benefits from
practicing the temporal transitions (Gupta et al., 2006; Mudambi & Swift, 2014; Swift, 2016).
The perspective articulates maintaining appropriate balance between exploration and exploitation
increase the firm’s adaptability (March, 1991) and firms deal more effectively with dynamic
ambidexterity by defending current advantages through exploitation as well as offering new
advantages through exploration (Mudambi & Swift, 2014; Swift, 2016). In contrast, the other
group of scholars defines that performance is retarded by executing the temporal transitions
(Kang & Kim, 2020). This perspective conceptualizes a temporal transition as punctuated leaps
between exclusive periods of exploration and exploitation (Burgelman, 2002; Romanelli &
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Tushman, 1994). Facing an august challenge of shifting between dramatically contrary and
conflicting routines and abilities, firms must pay undivided attention to either exploration or
exploitation during one particular time frame (Kang & Kim, 2020), thereby triggering
performance deterioration due to systematical friction cost and path dependence problem.
The two perspectives of performance implications of temporal transitions result from
varying organization theory literature. Positive performance implication of a temporal transition
is rooted in organizational ambidexterity theory (Cybert & March, 1963; Tushman & O'Reilly,
1996). Cybert and March (1963) argues that effective organizations are capable to resolve
conflicting tasks by clinging to diverging objectives at different times. Firms have ability to
simultaneously pursue exploration and exploitation, even as firms are prone to the pursue of
exploration during relatively dynamic periods while switching to the pursue of exploitation
during the relatively stable times (Levinthal & March, 1993). To achieve a dynamic balance
between exploration and exploitation over time, firms ambidextrously switch their focus over a
period involves a bunch of significant and compact transitions between differentiated
combinations of exploration and exploitation (Kang & Kim, 2020). Put differently, firms could
essentially engage in exploration and exploitation simultaneously even as they dynamically
remain in adaptation between exploration and exploitation. The idea of positive performance of a
temporal transition implies firms deal more effectively with ambidexterity by defending current
advantages through exploitation as well as shaping new advantages through exploration
(Mudambi & Swift, 2014; Swift, 2016), because they are efficient in as well as good at leaping
between exploration and exploitation and tend to outperform other peers that are less efficient
(Anderson & Tushman, 2001).
Negative performance implication originates from punctuated equilibrium theory
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(Burgelman, 2002; Romanelli & Tushman, 1994), where firms are supposed to approximate
stable periods of exploitation intertwined with sparse episodes of exploration (Kang & Kim,
2020). Firms allocate resources and attention to exploration and exploitation in a sequential
fashion (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997) by implementing discrete policies with inconsistent benefits
in each period (Lee & Puranam, 2016; Posen & Posen & Levinthal, 2012). Firms are immensely
challenged by rotating between contrary and conflicting routines and abilities for exploration vs
exploitation (Kang & Kim, 2020). In result, catering to the necessity of changing between and
exploitation, constant mutual switches of routines and capabilities in demand for exploration vs.
exploitation are likely to increase systematic friction cost and decrease organizational efficiency,
in turn impeding firm survival and development (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Nelson & Winter,
1982; Rivkin, 2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997; Winter, 2003). Path dependence (Lavie &
Rosenkopf, 2006), in addition, is another indispensable account for the negative performance
implication of a temporal transition, either causing firms to continue to pursue exploration
(exploitation) beyond the expected levels resulting in over-exploration (over-exploitation) (Kang
et al., 2017; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Levinthal & March, 1993; Nickerson & Zenger, 2002;
Wang & Li, 2008) or causing a mismatch for firms between exploitative (exploratory)
organizational structures presented and exploratory (exploitative) organizational structures
required.
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CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
3.1 Furthering Understanding on Performance Implications
We argue that the two polarized performance implications of a temporal transition might
be oversimplified and biased. Ambidexterity perspective considered a temporal transition as a
whole unit of analysis, disregarding the fundamental differences in inputs (i.e., routines,
structures, capabilities, resources etc.) and intrinsic characteristics (i.e., search range, time
horizon, degree of risk etc.) for exploration and exploitation, whereas punctuated equilibrium
perspective overstated the varying differences between exploration and exploitation even to the
point of conflicting and antagonizing. It is the matter of fact that recent studies have
demonstrated that the two sorts of inputs for exploration and exploitation are not fully
orthogonal, and some conceivable synergy may exist between the two types of inputs when firms
are on synchronous pursuit of exploration and exploitation (Gupta et al., 2006; Raisch et al.,
2009; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008; Raisch & Tushman, 2016) even if with a focus on either of
exploration or exploitation. Based on this point, we therefore attempt to further decouple a
temporal transition by going back to probe in their intrinsic heterogeneities between exploration
and exploitation to specify any potential complementarity.
We expect that a temporal transition characterized by prominent bilateral directivity have
diverging effects on firm performance. More precisely, we predict that a temporal transition from
exploitation to exploration has a negative effect on firm performance, while a temporal transition
from exploration to exploitation has a positive effect on firm performance. First, built on
March’s (1991) exploration-exploitation framework, differentiated internal characteristics
between exploitation and exploration determine more formidable challenges faced by a temporal
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transition from exploitation and exploration than the other way around. Firms are associated with
more risks when engaging in a temporal transition from exploitation to exploration than the
reversal case (DiMasi, Hansen, & Grabowski, 2003; Dyer, 1996). Different from exploitation,
exploration implies a broad irregular search process, associated with long time horizons, that
moves firms towards to an unpredictable exploration trajectory (Anderson & Tushman, 2001;
Argyres, 1996; Swift, 2016), accompanying by high degree of “uncertain and often negative”
(March, 1991: p85) outcomes. Firms on average switch from exploitation to exploration “only
when they have no alternatives” (Mudambi & Swift, 2014: p129) because exploration implies a
high irreversible cost (Barnett & Freeman, 2001; He & Wong, 2004). Once the profound change
from exploitation to exploration fails, firms need to pay a heavy price (Hannan & Freeman,
1977; Barnet & Freeman, 2001; Swift, 2016).
Second, organizational learning research between exploitation and exploration also
indicates that more inputs (i.e., effects and costs) might translate into lower learning benefits
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010; Koza & Lewin, 1998) when firms engage in a temporal transition
from exploitation to exploration. It is well established that organizational learning literature taps
into the tensions inherent in different types of exploitative vs exploratory knowledge (Hoang &
Rothaermel, 2010; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Park, Chen, & Gallagher, 2002; Pisano, 1996;
Rothaermel, 2001; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). Due to different knowledge characteristics
between exploitation to exploration, the performance deteriorating implications are inescapable
part of the temporal transition from exploitation to exploration in decreasing learning effect.
Firms are less likely to readily learn from their past or external exploitative experiences for better
performance in subsequent exploratory projects because exploitation are essentially focused on
local adjustments to extant inputs by exploiting current knowledge, but exploration pays
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attention to substantial development by exploring new and unknown knowledge (Hoang &
Rothaermel, 2010; March, 1991). Exploitative knowledge through transitional learning by doing
in relatively homogeneous contexts are less sufficient to complementarily transferring into
exploratory knowledge required to be new and cutting-edge in relatively heterogenous contexts
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010). During an exploitation, besides, the learning task is relevantly
simply with a relevantly clear focus, rendering firms more likely to succeed and perform well,
whereas during an exploration, the learning task is vaguer and more sophisticated without
relatively key focus, raising the challenge of learning for firms (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010).
In conclusion, a temporal transition from exploitation to exploration is subject to (a) the
challenge of inherent high-risk, long-time period, and strong uncertainty and (b) diminishing
learning effect problem, resulting in a negative performance implication.

Hypothesis (H1a). A significant and compact leap from exploitation to exploration has a
negative effect on firm performance.

In contrast, we expect that a temporal transition from exploration to exploitation has a
positive effect on firm performance. In particular, a temporal transition from exploration to
exploitation is much less likely to be subject to the two detriments of a temporal transition from
exploitation to exploration. In a temporal transition from exploration to exploitation, firms have
abilities to remain relatively ambidextrous. Under this scenario, firms are likely to rake in profits
and commercialize values in a relatively specialized focus during a short time horizon with less
risky inputs via exploitation. Therefore, they do not face the challenge of high-risk, long-time
period, and strong uncertainty rooted in the temporal transition from exploitation to exploration.
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Meantime, the temporal transition from exploration to exploitation is much less likely to suffer
from the performance deterioration problem subject to diminishing learning effect before. When
firms engage in a temporal transition from exploration to exploitation, they can easily
accumulate and leverage relevant exploitative experience from the prior or the external (Pisano,
1994). Besides, the relatively simple learning tasks in a transition from exploration to
exploitation is more likely to benefit exploitative projects. In addition, firms are naturally
opportunistic in exploitation to profit (Bens, Nagar, Skinner, & Wong, 2002; Gunny, 2010).
Recent research also shows that experience capabilities through positive learning processes in
turn enhance performance via selection effect beyond the original learning effect (Anand,
Mulotte, & Ren, 2016). In other words, the managerially opportunistic motives to shift from
exploration to exploitation may further enhance performance via selection effect.
In comparison, a temporal transition from exploration to exploitation is not subject to the
two disadvantages of (a) the challenge of inherent high-risk, long-time period, and strong
uncertainty and (b) diminishing learning effect problem. Therefore, we predict the following:

Hypothesis (H1b). A significant and compact leap from exploration to exploitation has a
positive effect on firm performance.

3.2 The Role of CEO Social Networks in Managing Ambidexterity
Strategy scholars have studied the crucial role of CEO social networks in impacting on
firm strategic decisions (Adams & Ragunathan, 2017; Brown, Gao, Lee, & Stathopoulos, 2012;
Cao, Simsek, & Jansen, 2015; El-Khatib, Fogel, & Jandik, 2015; Faleye, Kovacs, &
Venkateswaran, 2014; Griffin, Hong, Liu, & Ryou, 2021). Recent social networks research
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centered on the CEOs has indicated that CEO social networks are rich in valuable opportunies,
resources, and information in potential (Burt, 1992; Wasserman & Faust, 1994) and play a key
factor in influencing firm activities (Hwang & Kim, 2009; Fracassi & Tate, 2012; Khanna, Kim
& Lu, 2015) and performance (Collins & Clark, 2003; Kirchmaier & Stathopoulos, 2008;
McDonald, Khanna, & Westphal, 2008; Nu'man, Nurwandi, Bachtiar, Aspiranti, & Pratama,
2020). Therefore, we have strong arguments that CEO social networks also greatly influence the
organizational ambidexterity (Gilsing & Nooteboom, 2006; Krackhardt, 1992).
Gilsing and Nooteboom (2006) expressed, for instance, that firms are prone to have
sparse exclusive networks associated with formal ties in times of exploitation and dense open
networks characterized by informal and flexible ties in times of exploration. In addition, firms
might achieve an appropriate level of structural ambidexterity through strong ties between
managers in charge of separate business (Krackhardt, 1992). A variety of recent scholars, in fact,
have carved out the role of social networks of leaders and managers in shifting the resources in a
fashion to facilitate the movement between exploration and exploitation (Cao et al., 2006; Cao,
Simsek, & Zhang, 2010; Collins & Clark, 2003; Yang & Li, 2021). Aspects of CEO social
networks that paying attention to ambidexterity are primarily resulted from strong ties and weak
ties. Strong ties enhance mutual trust, gains and reciprocity, which promotes learning and
integration, and exchange of high-quality and tacit knowledge (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973;
Larson, 1992, Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000; Uzzi, 1996); while weak ties provide alternative
access to new knowledge and create new opportunities for potential cooperation (Beckman,
2006; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Dittrich, Duysters, & de Man, 2007; Granovetter, 1973;
Tiwana, 2008).

69

3.3 Moderating Role of CEO Social Networks
In H1a, the negative performance effect of a significant and compact leap from
exploitation to exploration is attributed to (a) the challenges of inherent high-risk, long-time
period, and strong uncertainty and (b) diminishing learning effect problem associated with the
directional shift. We conceive that these two mechanisms are affected by the CEO social
network centrality and structural holes based on the aforementioned arguments of CEO social
networks in managing ambidexterity.
3.3.1 Network Centrality

First, firms having CEOs with highly dense social networks demonstrate high level of
risk tolerance because it offers an alternative informal way to pool risks on CEOs’ socially
connected individuals (Bloch, Genicot, & Ray, 2008; Ferris, Javakhadze, & Rajkovic, 2017;
Genicot & Ray, 2005). Many firms tend to select CEOs with high degree of social network
centrality when they experience a substantial organizational environment change (Cao,
Maruping, & Takeuchi, 2006; Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992; Wiersema & Bantel; 1993). These
resources and opportunies embedded in social networks might promote firm’s adaptive
capabilities in a short period, thereby completing the conversion process of capabilities and
routines required beyond the formal organizational structure (Grant, 1996, Kogut & Zander,
1992) under the transition context of interest in our study.
The second challenge is that the diminishing learning effect in a significant and compact
leap from exploitation to exploration poses another barrier for firms with limited learning
capability for exploratory knowledge. As firms build up their exploitation landscape, they used
to leverage prior exploitative experience or learning from others. When firms subsequently
switch their strategic focus to an exploration orientation, the established dominant logic impedes
the learning effect on the novel exploratory activities. Firms with limited CEO social networks
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are at a disadvantage position in this regard, yet firms with larger web of social connects can
mine these unexploited social resources to perform new exploratory tasks, thereby breaking
through the bottleneck of organizational learning. As a result, firms with munificent centrality of
CEO social networks will have greater advantage on the temporal transition from exploitation to
exploration than those with limited one. Hence, we predict the following:

Hypothesis (H2a). The negative performance effect of a significant and compact leap
from exploitation to exploration is less (more) pronounced for the firm with a CEO who has high
(low) network centrality in his or her professional social network.

Based on the same principles, we argue that the positive performance effect of a
significant and compact leap from exploration to exploitation will be reinforced for firms with
high centrality of CEO social networks. Highly centralized CEOs could access a wide range of
contacts that occupy quality information and potential value (Collins & Clark, 2003) to the
strategic change of temporal transitions from exploration to exploitation. And a highly converged
network can also enable the CEO to gain timely information regarding how resources are
allocated and utilized across the departments as well as where additional valuable resources may
reside outside the firm (Cao et al., 2010; Ibarra, 1993; Sparrowe, Liden, Wayne, & Kraimer,
2001) so as to appropriately distribute resources in support of the temporal transition pursuits
from exploration to exploitation.
When firms need to switch their strategic focus from an exploratory to an exploitative
orientation, we don’t think the learning effect on the relatively less innovative exploitative
activities will be impeded. Because firms with a great deal of social ties can readily leverage
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their own prior exploitative experience or learn current exploitative experience from others.
Conversely, firms with constrained centrality of CEO social networks will point a disadvantage
standing on the temporal transition from exploration to exploitation than those with munificent
one. Hence, we predict the following:

Hypothesis (H2b). The positive performance effect of a significant and compact leap
from exploration to exploitation is more (less) pronounced for the firm with a CEO who has high
(low) network centrality in his or her professional social network.

3.3.2 Structural Holes

While highlighting the network centrality of CEO social networks in temporal transitions
for ambidexterity, we additionally reason that the associated performance implications will be
critically shaped by the structural holes of CEO social networks as well. In particular, we posit
that information advantage and cooperation opportunities from CEO social network structural
holes will be enhanced by the extent to which such information or opportunities are bridged or
brokered by external significant members in making decisions that underlie the firm’s pursuit of
temporal transitions for ambidexterity.
Firms with highly holes structured CEOs, first, will connect the separate, heterogenous,
and non-redundant business expertise (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999) in different business units and
firms and therefore ensure a sufficient level of integration as an informal organizational
operation to supplement formal structures (Stadler et al., 2014), thereby supporting the temporal
transition between exploitation and exploration. When CEOs enjoy an advantage network
position that has more of bridging opportunities from structural holes, they have a better chance
of moving beyond the local boundary of knowledge and information and accessing external
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knowledge from other fields (Cao, Maruping, & Takeuchi, 2006; Yang & Li, 2021), allowing
them to potentially smooth the transitioning process from exploitation to exploration and vice
versa. Furthermore, such boundary-spanning opportunities will help CEOs not only challenge
their extant frames of reference and modes of reasoning (Laursen & Salter, 2006), but also
increase creative cooperation chances with the external firms via their structure-specific social
ties, which is conductive to further alleviating the latent risks brought about by the temporal
transitions for ambidexterity. In contrast, firms with restrained CEO social network structural
holes are likely subject to the acquisition of external novelty knowledge and potential
cooperation to relieve the stress and tension in the temporal transitions for ambidexterity.
Therefore, we predict the following:

Hypothesis (H3a). The negative performance effect of a significant and compact leap
from exploitation to exploration is less (more) pronounced for the firm with a CEO who has high
(low) structural holes in his or her professional social network.
Hypothesis (H3b). The positive performance effect of a significant and compact leap
from exploration to exploitation is more (less) pronounced for the firm with a CEO who has high
(low) structural holes in his or her professional social network.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODS
4.1 Sample and Data
We collected our data from multiple sources: BoardEx, Execucomp, Compustat, CRSP,
and patents data. First, we drew social relationships data of CEOs in the U.S. publicly traded
firms from BoardEx, which specializes in relationship mapping and intelligence over one million
professionals and senior managers who served or are serving private and public organizations in
the U.S. and Europe and records a comprehensive set of biographic information of directors and
executives such as name, gender, job title, tenure, etc. (Chang & Wu, 2021). Then, we matched
BoardEx with Execucomp to obtain complete data of CEOs. Our patents data were constructed
from two sources. We obtained complete patent information from the UC Berkeley Fung
Institute Patent Data and we matched the patent data with our sample firms using the PatentCRSP matching dataset (Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, & Stoffman,, 2017). Finally, we merged
our CEO data with patents data, and firms with no granted patents or missing data were dropped
from the sample. Our final sample includes 3,614 observations comprising of 550 S&P 1500
firms with 896 CEOs in the high-tech sectors from 2000 to 2014.
4.2 Measures
4.2.1 Firm Performance

We follow prior studies examining the link between strategic change and financial
performance (Zhang & Rajagopalan, 2010) by using return on assets (ROA). We focus on
financial rather than market-oriented performance because the latter is primarily perceptual,
implying evaluation of investors for the future viability or firm growth potential (Gentry & Shen,
2010). Whereas financial or accounting-oriented measures of firm performance reflect the
realized financial outcomes (Wang Holmes, Oh & Zhu, 2016). ROA is calculated as net income
74

divided by total assets. We lead the difference of ROA by two-year (ROAt+2 – ROAt+1) in our
estimation models because it takes some time for CEO personal characteristics to manifest in the
dependent variable (Hambrick & Mason, 1984).
4.2.2 Temporal Leaps between Exploitation and Exploration

Temporal transitions are measured as the firm’s largest one-year change in R&D
expenditure over time for the 15-year study window (2000 - 2014) as maximized absolute value
for all residuals normalized with variances for each firm based on the Generalized
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model (Mudambi & Swift, 2014;
Swift, 2016). First, the model is run to estimate the firm-level R&D expenditure trend over time,
the generated residuals imply the frequency and extent to which R&D investment of the firm
differs from a forecast that is been reasonably predicted based on the firm’s historical R&D
expenditure trend (Anderson & Tushman, 2001; Folta & O’Brien, 2004; Oriani & Sobrero,
2008). The resulting model can be represented as follows:
𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽 ∙ 𝑅𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + ε𝑖,𝑡
σ2 (εi,t ) = = α 0 + δ1 ∙ σ2i,t−1 + α1 ∙ ε2i,t−1
where RDi,t is the annual R&D expenditure level of firm i at time t, and σ2 (εi,t ) is the variance of
the error term εi,t , which is distributed as a standard normal. Firms with very large residuals
mean that they have a quite leap R&D expenditure profile. Second, variances of the estimated
process are incorporated with normalization for all residuals generated. Third, the maximum of
the absolute values for all residuals for each firm is taken to measure the magnitude of a
temporal transition between exploration and exploitation. Fourth, two new variables are created
based on the residuals with largest absolute values. If the variable is positive, it captures the
sudden significant and compact increases in R&D spending (temporal transition from
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exploitation to exploration) and the variable indicating decreases in R&D spending is codified as
0. If the variable is negative, it captures the sudden significant and compact decreases in R&D
spending (temporal transition from exploration to exploitation) and the variable indicating
increases in R&D spending is codified as 0.
4.2.3 CEO Social Network Characteristics

We assessed CEO social network characteristics by applying the closeness centrality and
structural holes respectively used in the social network literature. We focus on closeness
centrality because the closeness centrality is usually interpreted as a measure of how long it takes
to spread information to all other nodes sequentially, implying independence from potential
control by intermediaries (McCulloh, Armstrong & Johnson, 2013). Closeness is calculated as
the reciprocal of the sum of the length of the shortest paths between the ego and other contacts in
the network, which reflects how efficiently and effectively an ego can obtain information from
the ego’s alters (Marchiori & Latora, 2000). The formula for closeness centrality is:
𝑛−1

𝐶𝑖 = ∑

𝑗 𝑑𝑖𝑗

𝑛

× , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁;
𝑁

where 𝐶𝑖 is the closeness centrality, 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the shortest distance between CEO i and contact j, n is
the size of component i belongs to, and N is the size of the entire yearly network. Besides, the
degree of structural holes is another frequently applied indicator to measure social network
embeddedness. The degree of CEO structural holes was measured with the inverse of Burt's
constraint. Burt's constraint indicates the extent to which an ego's time and energy are
concentrated in a single group of interconnected alters (Burt, 1992; Buskens & Van de Rijt,
2008). As such, the higher the constraint index, the fewer structural holes the focal CEO spans.
Thus, we used the natural log of the inverse of network constraint to measure the degree of
structural holes. The formula for the degree of structural holes is:
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𝐻𝑖 = ln

1
𝐶𝑖
2

𝐶𝑖 = ∑ (𝑝𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑞 𝑝𝑞𝑗 ) , 𝑖 ≠ 𝑞 ≠ 𝑗
𝑗

𝑞

where 𝐻𝑖 is the degree of structural holes on node i, 𝐶𝑖 is the degree of network constraint on
node i, 𝑝𝑖𝑗 is the proportion of node i's network time and energy spent on contact j, 𝑝𝑖𝑗 =
𝑧𝑖𝑗 / ∑𝑞 𝑧𝑖𝑞 , and variable 𝑧𝑖𝑗 measures the strength of the connection between nodes i and j, so the
contact-specific constraint 𝑐𝑖𝑗 varies from 0 to 1 with the extent to which i's network time and
energy is directly (𝑝𝑖𝑗 ) or indirectly (∑𝑞 𝑝𝑖𝑞 𝑝𝑞𝑗 ) spent on contact j. We took the natural log of the
inverse of network constraint to keep the original proportional relations between constraint and
degree of structural holes.
4.2.4 Control Variables

We control for factors at multiple levels of analysis that might correlate to our focal
variables and the mechanisms described. At the industry level, we control for industry
munificence, complexity, and dynamism (Connelly, Haynes, Tihanyi, Gamache, & Devers,
2013) because they determine the discretion of managers for strategical decision making under
the available resources and opportunities to the firm (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998). Industry
munificence represent the ability to support growth, being measured using five-year average
growth in sales and growth in operating income in each industry (Dess & Beard, 1984). We
regressed industry sales or industry operating income on year and took the antilog of the
regression slope coefficient as the indicator for munificence. Industry dynamism represent the
inability to support sustainable growth and is measured as the antilog of the standard error of
each regression slope coefficient from this regression (Keats & Hitt, 1988). Industry complexity
indicates the extent to which market size and power of industry participants are heterogeneous
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and is measured based on an index of dynamic concentration, which is Herfindahl's index of all
firms' market share in an industry in a year (Fischer & Pollock, 2004). At the firm level, we
control for firm size, M/B ratio, firm slack, R&D intensity, and industry diversification. Firm
size is assessed as the natural logarithm of total employees listed in the company during the year
(Josefy, Kuban, Ireland, & Hitt, 2015). As an indicator of market performance, we use M/B ratio,
calculated as the ratio of the market value of the firm to its book value. Firm slack is measured as
the annual working capital ratio (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990), reflecting firm’s excess cash
holdings over future needs. R&D intensity is also included as a control variable, since research
shows that R&D-based innovation drives firm performance (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
Diversification is estimated as with a Herfindahl index (HHI) based on firm sales from different
two-digit SIC industry groups (Kaul, 2012). Third, at the individual level, we control for the
number of years the executive has held the CEO position (CEO tenure), the percentage of
common shares and options owned by the CEO (CEO ownership), and whether the CEO is chair
of boarder or not (CEO duality). Each of these attributes may affect CEOs’ social and cognitive
structures and how they make decisions (Faccio, Marchica, & Mura, 2016; Krause, Semadeni, &
Cannella, 2014). Finally, at the social network level, we included betweenness centrality as a
control variable. Since network literature has differentiated that the distinctiveness between
betweenness and closeness centrality: betweenness centrality is generally perceived as a measure
of the extent and efficiency as a bridge along the shortest path between two other nodes,
reflecting others’ dependence on a given node (Jones, Ma & McNally, 2021), yet closeness
centrality is usually interpreted as a measure of how long it takes to spread information to all
other nodes sequentially, implying independence from potential control by intermediaries
(McCulloh, Armstrong & Johnson, 2013).
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4.3 Analysis
Our data is an unbalanced panel of S&P 1500 firms in high-tech sector over multiple
years, and our focus dependent variable is continuous. Based on this data structure, we tested our
hypotheses using fixed effects panel regression. We estimated these models using the xtreg
command in STATA 16. The Hausman test was statistically significant (χ2 = 79.73, p = .0000),
suggesting that a fixed effects model is preferred because a random-effects model estimates
inconsistently. The fixed effects model is conducive to control for any time-invariant
unobservable idiosyncratic differences across firms that can influence our dependent variable
(Brüderl & Ludwig, 2015), such as firm culture. We also included robust standard errors in
estimation models to address heteroskedasticity to further alleviate possible estimating bias.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS
5.1 Main Results from Fixed Effects Regression
Table 2.1.1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables included in the
research. Variance inflation factors (VIFs) are all within a reasonable range from 1.01 to 1.79
with an average of 1.20, suggesting that multicollinearity is less likely an issue. The correlation
coefficients between firm performance and temporal leaps are -.010 and 0.06 (significant at the
confidence level of 95%) respectively, implying a preliminary support for H1b.
Table 2.2.1 and 2.3.1 present results from the fixed effects models predicting change in
firm performance in t+2 by using closeness centrality and structural holes as main CEO social
network characteristics measurement respectively. In table 2.2.1, Model 1 is the basic model
with the control variables; Models 2 add the two types of temporal transitions to test H1a and
H1b; Models 3 and 4 respectively add the interactions for temporal transitions between
exploration and exploitation with closeness centrality or structural holes respectively; and
Models 5 is the fully specified models including all two interactions.
Results in Table 2.2.1 are also supportive of the notion that directional temporal
transitions between exploration and exploitation do have a clear distinctive effect on firm
performance. Specifically, a insignificant leap from exploitation to exploration is negative to
firm performance (b = -.010, p > .1), while a significant leap from exploration to exploitation is
positive to firm performance (b = .070, p < .05). And this relationship appears to be the same in
Model 3 to 5 contingent on the CEO social network closes centrality included in our theorizing.
H1b thus receive support strongly. We argue, additionally, that the negative performance effect
of a significant and compact leap from exploitation to exploration is less pronounced in H2a,
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while the positive performance effect of a significant and compact leap from exploration to
exploitation is more pronounced in H2b, for the firm with a CEO who has high degree of social
network closeness centrality. In Table 2.2.1, Model 3 displays positive and statistically
insignificant interaction between a significant and compact leap from exploitation to exploration
and closeness centrality on firm performance (b = 161.2, p > .1). Model 4, nonetheless, displays
negative and statistically significant interaction between a significant and compact leap from
exploration to exploitation and closeness centrality on firm performance (b = -1133.8, p < .1).
Therefore, H2a receives no support and H2b receives an opposition. In response to this point, we
made a further analysis by splitting the samples using the median value of CEO social network
closeness centrality, and we found the weakening phenomenon of positive performance
implications from the temporal transition from exploration to exploitation only exists in the
subsample with high degree of CEO social network closeness centrality rather than the other
subsample with low degree. Prior research, as a matter of fact, has shown that this could be
possible because excessive network closeness centrality implies that formidable CEO social
power might lead their tendency to engage more risky exploratory activities rather than the less
risky exploitative activities (Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Lewellyn & Muller, 2012; Li & Yang,
2019).
We also use structural holes as another important factor in CEO social network
characteristics to test H3a and H3b. In Table 2.3.1, it’s observed that H1a and H1b garner
varying degrees of support across each model. When it comes to H3a and H3b, the alleviated
negative performance effect of a significant and compact leap from exploitation to exploration
when the firm with a CEO who has a high degree of network structural holes is statistically
significant (b = .019, p < .05) (Model 3), whereas the strengthened positive performance effect of
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a significant and compact leap from exploration to exploitation when the firm with a CEO who
has a high degree of network structural holes becomes statistically insignificant (b = -.008,
p > .1) (Model 4). This result suggests that high structured CEO social network may critically
regulate the deteriorating performance effect of a temporal transition from exploitation to
exploration, but it may not critically regulate the augmenting performance effect of a temporal
transition from exploration to exploitation. Hence, this result is consistent with our theoretical
argument for H3a but not for H3b.
To further understand the nature of this effect, we plot the supportive interactions in
Figure 2.1.1 and 2.2.1. In the plot of Figure 2.1.1, the low degree of CEO network closeness
centrality is represented at the maximum of either one standard deviation below the mean (-1SD)
of the variable or 0, and high degree of CEO network closeness centrality is represented at one
standard deviation above the mean (+1SD).
The blue dash line plot demonstrates a relatively flat negative relationship between a
significant and compact leap from exploration to exploitation and changes in firm performance
when CEO network closeness centrality is low (0). In our sample, increasing from low to high
degree of temporal transition from exploration to exploitation regarding the high level of CEO
network closeness centrality (+1 SD) is related to 25.81 percent decrease in firm performance
(.0092/.0124 – 1 = .2581). This reflects a relevant decrease in firm performance. In contrast, in
the low level of CEO network closeness centrality, increasing from low to high magnitude of the
temporal transition from exploration to exploitation is associated with an exorbitant 171.26
percent increase in firm performance (.0472/ (.0174) - 1 = 1.7126). Based on these analyses, we
find an opposing point of view in the empirical test against our theoretical arguments about H2b
in terms of the moderating effect from CEO social network closeness centrality.
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We also plot the interaction between a temporal transition from exploitation to
exploration and structural holes in Figure 2.2.1, the red solid line plot demonstrates a relatively
flat negative relationship between a significant and compact leap from exploitation to exploration
and firm performance when CEO network structural holes is high (+1SD). In our sample,
increasing from low to high degree of temporal transition from exploitation to exploration
regarding the low level of CEO network structural holes is related to 174.68 percent decrease in
firm performance (-.0059/.0079-1 = -1.7468). This reflects a relevant dramatical decrease in firm
performance. In contrast, in the high level of CEO network structural holes, increasing from low
to high magnitude of the temporal transition from exploration to exploitation is associated with a
relevant flat range of 85.71 percent decrease in firm performance (.0008/ (-.0056)-1 = -.85.71).
Based on these analyses, we find a strongly supportive point of view in the empirical test
consistent with our theoretical arguments about H3a in terms of the moderating effect from CEO
social network structural holes.
5.2 Robustness Check
We also use eigenvector centrality, which means that a tie is connected to other ties who
with high scores, as a proxy for network centrality (Table 2.4.1 Model 3). We found that the
negative performance effects of a significant and compact leap from exploitation to exploration
(b = -.011, p < .05) as well as the positive performance effects of a significant and compact leap
back (b = .062, p < .01) are both significant in the full sample. Hence, this result is consistent
with our theoretical argument for H1a and H1b. In terms of the interaction term, the negative
performance effects of a significant and compact leap from exploitation to exploration (b = .926,
p < .01) as well as the positive performance effects of a significant and compact leap from
exploration to exploitation (b = -2.749, p < .1) are both mitigated significantly. Hence, this result
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is consistent with our theoretical argument for H2a but against H2b. When we split the sample
using eigenvector centrality alone, the negative performance effects of a significant and compact
leap from exploitation to exploration are only significant (b = -.016, p < .001) in the high CEO
social network centrality sub-sample, whereas the positive performance effects of a significant
and compact leap from exploration to exploitation (b = .106, p < .001) are significant only in the
low CEO social network centrality sub-sample (Table 2.4.1 Model 4 and Model 5). This result
suggests that CEO social network centrality critically affects the performance implications of
temporal transitions in ambidexterity.
Similarly, we also use network constraint as a proxy for network centrality (Table 2.5.1
Model 2). The consistence with our theoretical argument for H1a and H1b is basically verified.
In terms of the interaction term, the negative performance effects of a significant and compact
leap from exploitation to exploration is mitigated significantly (b = -.031, p < .05), whereas the
positive performance effects of a significant and compact leap from exploration to exploitation
(b = -.102, p > .1) is insignificant. Hence, this result is consistent with our theoretical argument
for H3a but inconsistent with H3b. When we split the sample using network constraint alone, the
negative performance effects of a significant and compact leap from exploitation to exploration
(b = -.020, p < .01) as well as the positive performance effects of a significant and compact leap
from exploration to exploitation (b = .065, p < .05) are both significantly in the high degree of
network constraint sub-sample (Table 2.5.1 Model 4) but neither significantly in the low degree
sub-sample (Table 2.5.1 Model 5). This result suggests that CEO social network structures holes
critically affects the performance implications of temporal transitions in ambidexterity.
Third, to further strengthen the validity and robustness of our results for the moderating
effects of CEO social networks, we also leveraged the absolute value of firm performance by
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specifying ROA at year t+1 as proxy for the dependent variable (Table 2.6.1 and 2.7.1). From the
Table 2.6.1, we observe that the significant and compact leap from exploitation to exploration (b
= -.01, p < .01) and the leap back (b = .059, p < .01) are both statistically significant at the
confidence level of 99% (Model 2), and that the positive performance effects of a significant and
compact leap from exploration to exploitation is mitigated significantly (b = -.070, p < .1)
(Model 2), whereas the negative performance effects of a significant and compact leap from
exploration to exploitation (b = .006, p > .1) is insignificant (Model 3). As a result, our
theoretical arguments for H1b and H2b are consistently estimated. The similar story was found
in the moderating effects of structural holes in Table 2.7.1, the significant and compact leap from
exploitation to exploration is significant (b = .010, p < .01) and the leap back is significant (b
= .059, p < .01) as well at the confidence level of 95% (Model 2), and that the negative
performance effects of a significant and compact leap from exploitation to exploration (b = .005,
p <.05) is significantly alleviated (Model 3), whereas the positive performance effects of a
significant and compact leap from exploration to exploitation is insignificant (b = -.001, p > .1)
(Model 4), As a result, our theoretical arguments for H1a and H3a are consistently estimated.
Besides, we consider possible selection bias by incorporating non-high-tech sampling
firms into our sample and still receive similar conclusions. While our firm fixed effects
regression and the one-year lagged structure of our regression may help strengthen the causal
inference based on our regression results, last but not the least, we also try to establish a stronger
case for our conclusions by using the difference-in-difference (DID) estimation model (Mora &
Reggio, 2015). We find that the DID test is consistent with our regression estimates (i.e., b =
-.02, t = 2.79, p = .005, for H1a; b = .011, t = 2.39, p = .017 for H1b).

85

CHAPTER 6
DISCUSSION
Two opposing perspectives of literature on performance implications of the temporal
transitions between exploration and exploitation suggest that firms may have a better or worse
performance when engagement in the temporal transitions. In this study, we investigate how the
two directionally different types of temporal transitions between exploration and exploitation
varyingly affect firm performance. We show that the magnitude of significant and compact
changes in R&D expenditure from exploitation to exploration has a negative performance effect
while the temporal transition from exploration to exploitation has a positive performance effect.
Interestingly, we also find evidence that the positive performance implications of a temporal
transition from exploration to exploitation are less pronounced for firms with higher degree of
network centrality and that the negative performance implications of a temporal transition from
exploitation to exploration are less pronounced for firms with higher degree of structural holes,
implying that the two different CEO social network structural characteristics play an
indispensable role in enabling firms to perform this profound form of organizational change
beyond classic literature from a firm level of analysis. We conclude our study by discussing the
contributions to the temporal transition and ambidexterity literature, social network literature,
limitations, and future research implications.
6.1 Research Implications
Our major contribution is adding to the increasingly growing research on temporal
transitions (Luger, Raisch, & Schimmer, 2018; Raisch & Tushman, 2016; Zimmermann et al.,
2015). Although a temporal transition has been regarded as an unignorable mechanism for firms
to balance exploration and exploitation, there is competing opinions in terms of firm
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performance implications during a significant and compact temporal transition. Some studies
agree to performance enhancement of a temporal transition (Anderson & Tushman, 2001; Kang
& Kim, 2020; Mudambi & Swift, 2014; Swift, 2016), while other studies are into performance
deterioration of a temporal transition (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Nelson & Winter, 1982;
Rivkin, 2000; Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003). In this study, we compare the two types of
performance implications of a temporal transition, clarify their cons and pros, and theoretically
predict and empirically test the diverging performance implications based on their intrinsic
characteristics and differentiated learning effect within each transition. Our prediction and
findings add some more details on future research on temporal transition between exploration
and exploitation.
In addition, we attempt to join the latest development on CEO social networks in the
strategy literature to the ambidexterity literature. Although strategy literature has recognized the
importance of CEO social networks (or social capital) in corporate governance and strategic
decisions (Adams & Ragunathan, 2017; Brown et al., 2012; Cao et al., 2015; El-Khatib, Fogel et
al., 2014; Griffin et al., 2021), it has not considered how to incorporate CEO social network
embeddedness into ambidexterity literature. We consider this in our theoretical predictions and
argue that firms enjoy benefits in the context of temporal transition between exploration and
exploitation when their CEOs have a high degree of CEO network embeddedness. We believe
that examining the possible distinctive performance implications of a temporal transition from
CEO social networks will provide a variety of opportunities for future ambidexterity research.
6.2 Limitations and Future Research
Our study has several limitations, which also suggest directions for future research. First,
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the empirically implicit focus in associated with the temporal transitions between exploration and
exploitation in technology innovation and knowledge learning, implying that our findings on the
performance implications of a temporal transition may be constrained by the context of
innovation (Kang & Kim, 2020), R&D spending is quite different in the level of absolute value
as well as a percentage of revenue across different industries and sectors, which renders it
challenging to gauge the change in temporal transitions with the same rule. Second, our R&D
expenditure-based measure of a temporal transition between exploration and exploitation has
some limitations. R&D expenditure may be an input of firm innovation but it’s not an accurate
measure for the real picture of a firm’s innovativeness, having a change in the R&D process is
different from a change in the concentration of technologies invented to achieve the firm
performance; R&D spending is, besides, a long-term investment for most tech-oriented firms and
the process of R&D capitalization vs expenses based on accounting principles can also have a
big impact on our operationalization on the measurement of temporal transitions. We expect that
future research should take this into account and figure out a more precise model to estimate the
variances of R&D spending. Third, there may be another type of temporal transitions unexplored
in our study. We used a GARCH model to estimate the temporal transitions based on the change
in historical R&D expenditure in a 15-year window, however, it’s a matter of fact that a shorter
temporal gap (i.e., 3 years or 5 years) between exploration and exploitation is fairly practical
when firms engage in a significant and compact leap. We expect that such a discontinuous leap
with a shorter temporal gap may provide us potential evidence on the performance implications.
6.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, our study extends the understanding of complexity in performance
implications of temporal transitions and CEO networks analysis into ambidexterity research. In
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particular, we show that a temporal transition from exploitation to exploration has a negative
performance effect while a temporal transition from exploration to exploitation has a negative
performance effect. In addition, we also find evidence that the positive performance implications
of a temporal transition from exploration to exploitation are less pronounced for firms with
higher degree of network centrality and that the negative performance implications of a temporal
transition from exploitation to exploration are less pronounced for firms with higher degree of
structural holes. Our study offers significant research implications on ambidexterity literature
and social networks literature as well as important managerial implications for business
practices.
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TABLE 2.1.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

4

Change in Firm
performance
Leap from exploitation
to exploration
Leap from exploration
to exploitation
Closeness centrality a

5

Structural Holes

-.011

.011

.015

.132*

6

Industry dynamism

.054*

-.037*

-.028

-.217*

-.061*

7

Industry complexity

.003

-.011

.001

.033*

.015

.061*

8

Industry munificence

.010

.032*

.032*

-.092*

-.038*

.294*

-.104*

9

R&D intensity

.134*

.023

-.000

.005

.009

-.031*

-.208*

.099*

10

Firm slack

-.058*

-.000

-.014

-.043*

-.071*

.026

-.187*

.021

.351*

11

Firm size

.-.009

-.006

.032*

.081*

.105*

-.064*

.164*

-.004

-.322*

-.478*

12

Firm diversification

-.009

.000

-.008

.045*

-.002

-.019

.083*

-.042*

-.177*

-.123*

.243*

13

M/B ratio

-.021

.022

.003

-.005

-.014

-.030

-.078*

.009

.026

-.016

.030

.007

14

CEO duality

-.025

-.016

.016

-.013

.035*

.042*

.013

-.015

-.111*

-.075*

.060*

-.010

.003

15

CEO ownership

.001

.019

.021

.153*

.031*

-.158*

-.058*

-.002

.036*

.065*

-.179*

-.028

.040*

-.072*

16

CEO tenure

-.019

.026

.033*

-.100*

.066*

-.000

-.094*

.044*

.026

.149*

-.087*

-.028

.038*

.024

Mean

-.001

.115

-.019

1.745

2.231

.034

.237

.062

.161

2.767

1.826

1.229

3.345

.874

1.081

1.415

.161

.465

.121

.617

.836

.031

.193

.072

.268

2.365

1.308

.674

3.441

.332

2.848

7.408

1
2
3

SD

-.010
.060*

.039*

.046*

.026

-.004

Note: t statistics in parentheses, * p < .05; N = 3,614. a. The mean and SD values of normalized closeness centrality are multiplied by 1.0e+4.
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.373*

TABLE 2.2.1 Fixed Effects Panel Regression Models Predicting Change in Firm Performance
(Closeness Centrality)
DV: Change in Firm Performance

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Constant

.086***
(3.10)

.081***
(2.92)

.134***
(3.97)

.132***
(3.87)

.134***
(3.94)

Industry dynamism

.390***
(3.85)

.393***
(3.92)

.425*
(4.17)

.423*
(4.15)

.423*
(4.15)

Industry complexity

.056
(1.47)

.048
(1.26)

.025
(.63)

.026
(.66)

.025
(.63)

Industry munificence

-.078**
(-2.09)

-.080**
(-2.14)

-.076**
(-2.04)

-.078**
(-2.07)

-.078**
(-2.07)

R&D intensity

.234***
(5.40)

.238***
(5.45)

.241***
(5.45)

.240***
(5.41)

.240***
(5.42)

Firm slack

-.016***
(-6.21)

-.016***
(-6.23)

-.016***
(-6.19)

-.016***
(-6.16)

-.016***
(-6.18)

Firm size

-.050***
(-4.74)

-.046***
(-4.45)

-.054***
(-4.91)

-.056***
(-5.04)

-.056***
(-5.05)

Firm diversification

-.0001
(-.03)

-.0005
(-.12)

-.002
(-.54)

-.002
(-.54)

-.002
(-.50)

M/B ratio

-.001
(-.72)

-.001
(-.81)

-.001
(-.66)

-.001
(-.67)

-.001
(-.67)

CEO duality

-.004
(-.46)

-.004
(-.47)

-.004
(-.42)

-.004
(-.42)

-.004
(-.40)

CEO ownership

.0005
(.51)

.0005
(.47)

-.0003
(.25)

-.0004
(.35)

-.0003
(.33)

CEO tenure

-.001
(-1.29)

-.001
(-1.25)

-.0003
(-.59)

-.0003
(-.54)

-.0003
(-.57)

Betweenness centrality

-1.234*
(-1.94)

-1.071*
(-1.70)

-1.154*
(-1.85)

-1.094*
(-1.75)

-1.091*
(-1.75)

Leap from exploitation to exploration

-.0008
(-.81)

-.037
(-.88)

-.001
(.97)

-.035
(-.82)

Leap from exploration to exploitation

.070**
(2.33)

.067**
(2.21)

.257**
(2.32)

.256**
(2.31)

199.8***
(3.74)
161.2
(.74)

239.2***
(4.25)

230.7***
(4.14)
Leap from exploitation to exploration
146.3
x Closeness Centrality
(.67)
Leap from exploration to exploitation
-1133.8*
-1128.7*
x Closeness Centrality
(-1.88)
(-1.87)
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
3,614
3,614
3,614
3,614
3,614
Observations
R-square
.0960
.1007
.1040
.1082
.1084
All tests are two-tailed: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Coefficients of year fixed effects are not shown due to space constraints.
Closeness Centrality
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TABLE 2.3.1 Fixed Effects Panel Regression Models Predicting Change in Firm Performance
(Structural Holes)
DV: Change in Firm Performance

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Constant

.087***
(3.13)

.082***
(2.95)

.134***
(3.97)

.132***
(3.87)

.134***
(3.94)

Industry dynamism

.392***
(3.86)

.394***
(3.92)

.247*
(1.91)

.244*
(1.86)

.249*
(1.90)

Industry complexity

.054
(1.42)

.046
(1.21)

.005
(.14)

.004
(.11)

.005
(.14)

Industry munificence

-.079**
(-2.11)

-.080**
(-2.16)

-.148***
(-3.95)

-.149***
(-3.97)

-.148***
(-3.93)

R&D intensity

.235***
(5.41)

.238***
(5.45)

.232***
(5.43)

.232***
(5.43)

.232***
(5.43)

Firm slack

-.016***
(-6.21)

-.016***
(-6.23)

-.015***
(-5.95)

-.014***
(-5.91)

-.015***
(-5.95)

Firm size

-.050***
(-4.72)

-.046***
(-4.43)

-.048***
(-4.32)

-.048***
(-4.36)

-.048***
(-4.34)

Firm diversification

-.0001
(-.02)

-.0005
(-.11)

-.004
(-.85)

-.003
(-.82)

-.004
(-.86)

M/B ratio

-.001
(-.70)

-.001
(-.81)

.0001
(.41)

.0001
(.41)

.0001
(.41)

CEO duality

-.004
(-.46)

-.004
(-.47)

-.0004
(-.82)

-.0004
(-.82)

-.0004
(-.81)

CEO ownership

.0005
(.51)

.0005
(.47)

.0001
(.07)

.0001
(.10)

.0001
(.07)

CEO tenure

-.001
(-1.29)

-.001
(-1.25)

-.0004
(-.82)

-.0004
(-.82)

-.0004
(-.81)

Betweenness Centrality

-1.234*
(-1.94)

-1.071*
(-1.70)

-.968
(-1.48)

-.957
(-1.46)

-.978
(-1.50)

Leap from exploitation to exploration

-.008
(-.81)

-.056**
(-2.03)

-.012
(-1.25)

-.056**
(-2.02)

Leap from exploration to exploitation

.070**
(2.33)

.071*
(2.34)

.085
(.96)

.070
(.80)

-.007*
(-1.73)
.019**
(1.98)

-.006
(-1.47)

-.007
(-1.64)
.019**
(1.97)
-.007
(-.21)
Yes
Yes
3,614
.1353

Structural Holes
Leap from exploitation to exploration
x Structural Holes
Leap from exploration to exploitation
x Structural Holes
Year fixed effects
Firm fixed effects
Observations
R-square

Yes
Yes
3,614
.0960

Yes
Yes
3,614
.1007

Yes
Yes
3,614
.1353

-.008
(-.23)
Yes
Yes
3,614
.1345

All tests are two-tailed: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Coefficients of year fixed effects are not shown due to space constraints.
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TABLE 2.4.1 Moderation Effect Tests Using Alternative Measures of Network Centrality

DV: Firm Performance
Sample split criteria

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)
High

(5)
Low

Constant

-.075***
(-2.57)

-.075***
(-2.56)

-.075***
(-2.56)

-.072
(-1.39)

-.085**
(-2.27)

Industry dynamism

-.315***
(-3.93)

-.313***
(-3.91)

-.313***
(-3.91)

-.383***
(-4.17)

-.236***
(-1.95)

Industry complexity

.069
(1.52)

.068
(1.50)

.069
(1.51)

.060
(1.08)

-.018
(-.25)

Industry munificence

.074***
(2.39)

.074***
(2.40)

.074***
(2.39)

.071**
(2.07)

.081
(1.41)

R&D expenditure b

-.221***
(-3.44)

-.206***
(-3.21)

-.217***
(-3.38)

-.164***
(-3.39)

-1.74***
(-2.87)

Firm slack

.010***
(4.30)

.010***
(4.30)

.010***
(4.30)

.010**
(2.45)

.011***
(3.82)

Firm size

.023*
(2.03)

.023*
(1.98)

.023*
(2.02)

.029
(1.63)

.068***
(2.85)

Firm diversification

.004
(.78)

.004
(.78)

.004
(.77)

.006
(.93)

-.001
(-.10)

.004***
(4.28)

.004***
(4.35)

.004***
(4.29)

.004***
(2.99)

.005***
(3.01)

CEO duality

.011
(1.26)

.011
(1.25)

.011
(1.25)

-.001
(-.89)

.010
(.82)

CEO ownership

.002
(1.26)

.002
(1.23)

.002
(1.25)

-.001
(.89)

.005**
(2.20)

CEO tenure

-.0004
(-.58)

-.0003
(-.57)

-.0003
(-.58)

.001
(.85)

-.003**
(-2.29)

Leap from exploitation to exploration

-.011**
(-2.97)

-.010***
(-2.88)

-.011**
(-2.98)

-.016***
(-3.20)

-.004
(-.76)

Leap from exploration to exploitation

.059***
(2.84)

.062***
(2.81)

.062***
(2.80)

.034
(1.59)

.106***
(2.92)

-.025
(-.07)
.916***
(2.92)

-.020
(-.06)

M/B ratio

-.101
(-.30)
Leap from exploitation to exploration
.926***
x Eigenvector centrality
(2.93)
Leap from exploration to exploitation
-2.700*
-2.749*
x Eigenvector centrality
(-1.83)
(--1.87)
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
4,164
4,164
4,164
2,079
2,085
R-square
.0652
.0711
.0714
.101
.0764
All tests are two-tailed: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Coefficients of year fixed effects are not shown due to space constraints. b. The coefficient values of R&D
expenditure is multiplied by 1.0e+4.
Eigenvector centrality
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TABLE 2.5.1 Moderation Effect Tests Using Alternative Measures of Structural Holes

DV: Firm Performance
Sample split criteria

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)
High

(5)
Low

Constant

-.066***
(-2.22)

-.065***
(-2.19)

-.066***
(-2.19)

-.077**
(-2.11)

-.073
(-1.47)

Industry dynamism

-.310***
(-3.86)

-.310***
(-3.86)

-.310***
(-3.86)

-.261**
(-2.04)

-.276***
(-2.86)

Industry complexity

.066
(1.47)

.065
(1.46)

.065
(1.47)

.062
(1.03)

.002
(.03)

Industry munificence

.073***
(2.40)

.073***
(2.37)

.073***
(2.37)

.036
(.74)

.097**
(2.08)

R&D expenditure b

-.214***
(-3.44)

-.210***
(-3.40)

-.213***
(-3.44)

-.166
(-1.40)

-.192***
(-3.41)

Firm slack

.010***
(4.26)

.010***
(4.26)

.010***
(4.26)

.010***
(4.14)

.009**
(2.02)

Firm size

.022*
(1.90)

.022*
(1.88)

.022*
(1.88)

.032*
(1.89)

.010
(.55)

Firm diversification

.004
(.74)

.004
(.73)

.004
(.72)

.001
(-.21)

.008
(1.13)

.004***
(4.34)

.004***
(4.36)

.004***
(4.34)

.005***
(2.86)

.003**
(2.52)

CEO duality

.011
(1.23)

.011
(1.24)

.011
(1.23)

.003
(-.22)

.033**
(2.36)

CEO ownership

.002
(1.21)

.002
(1.22)

.002
(1.22)

-.0001
(-.10)

.003
(1.21)

CEO tenure

-.0003
(-.55)

-.0003
(-.53)

-.0003
(-.54)

-.0001
(-.16)

.001
(.81)

Leap from exploitation to exploration

-.006
(-1.42)

-.010***
(-2.91)

-.006
(-1.43)

-.020***
(-3.13)

-.002
(-.44)

Leap from exploration to exploitation

.058***
(2.84)

.075***
(2.70)

.075***
(2.69)

.065**
(2.24)

.050
(1.42)

-.038
(-1.13)
-.031**
(-2.02)

-.043
(-1.27)

M/B ratio

-.041
(-1.18)
Leap from exploitation to exploration
-.031**
x Network Constraint
(-1.98)
Leap from exploration to exploitation
-.104
-.102
x Network Constraint
(-1.00)
(-.98)
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
4,164
4,164
4,164
2,083
2,.081
R-square
.0652
.0711
.0726
.0833
.0755
All tests are two-tailed: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Coefficients of year fixed effects are not shown due to space constraints. b. The coefficient values of R&D
expenditure is multiplied by 1.0e+4.
Network Constraint
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TABLE 2.6.1 Fixed Effects Regression Models Predicting Firm Performance (Closeness
Centrality)
DV: Firm Performance

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Constant

-.077***
(-2.64)

-.075***
(-2.58)

-.085***
(-2.84)

-.086***
(-2.90)

-.084***
(-2.82)

Industry dynamism

-.314***
(-3.93)

-.315***
(-3.94)

-.274***
(-3.42)

-.271***
(-3.37)

-.271***
(-3.36)

Industry complexity

.065
(1.44)

.069
(1.52)

.054
(1.21)

.055
(1.22)

.054
(1.21)

Industry munificence

.074***
(2.41)

.074***
(2.41)

.075***
(2.44)

.076***
(2.47)

.075***
(2.45)

R&D intensity b

-.234***
(-3.65)

-.208***
(-3.34)

-.234***
(-3.36)

-.233***
(-3.36)

-.231***
(-3.36)

Firm slack

.010***
(4.36)

.010***
(4.31)

.010***
(4.36)

.010***
(4.35)

.010***
(4.34)

Firm size

.024**
(2.08)

.023**
(1.99)

.017
(1.48)

.019
(1.59)

.018
(1.55)

.003
(.70)

.004
(.79)

.003
(.59)

.003
(.56)

.003
(.58)

.004***
(4.25)

.004***
(4.35)

.005***
(4.40)

.005***
(4.40)

.005***
(4.40)

CEO duality

.012
(1.36)

.011
(1.27)

.011
(1.24)

.011
(1.22)

.011
(1.24)

CEO ownership

.002
(1.24)

.002
(1.24)

.001
(.93)

.001
(.95)

.001
(.96)

CEO tenure

-.0004
(-.65)

-.0003
(-.57)

-.0001
(-.18)

-.0001
(-.15)

-.0001
(-.18)

Leap from exploitation to exploration

-.010***
(-2.87)

-.020***
(-2.31)

-.010***
(-2.87)

-.021***
(-2.39)

Leap from exploration to exploitation

.059***
(2.85)

.062***
(2.99)

.189***
(2.30)

.190***
(2.31)

.012**
(2.30)
.006
(1.28)

.012**
(2.16)

.011**
(2.01)
.006
(1.37)

-.070*
(-1.74)

-.070*
(-1.74)

Firm diversification
M/B ratio

Closeness centrality
Leap from exploitation to exploration
x Closeness centrality
Leap from exploration to exploitation
x Closeness centrality

Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
4,164
4,164
4,164
4,164
4,164
R-square
.0652
.0711
.0740
.0760
.0762
All tests are two-tailed: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Coefficients of year fixed effects are not shown due to space constraints. b. The coefficient values of R&D
expenditure is multiplied by 1.0e+4.
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TABLE 2.7.1 Fixed Effects Panel Regression Models Predicting Firm Performance (Structural
Holes)
DV: Firm Performance

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Constant

-.077***
(-2.64)

-.075***
(-2.58)

-.087***
(-3.01)

-.088***
(-3.04)

-.087***
(-3.00)

Industry dynamism

-.314***
(-3.93)

-.315***
(-3.94)

-.310***
(-3.88)

-.310***
(-3.88)

-.310***
(-3.87)

Industry complexity

.065
(1.44)

.069
(1.52)

.065
(1.47)

.065
(1.46)

.065
(1.47)

Industry munificence

.074***
(2.41)

.074***
(2.41)

.074***
(2.42)

.074***
(2.41)

.074***
(2.41)

R&D expenditure b

-.234***
(-3.65)

-.208***
(-3.37)

-.216***
(-3.46)

-.212***
(-3.42)

-.216***
(-3.46)

Firm slack

.010***
(4.36)

.010***
(4.31)

.010***
(4.22)

.010***
(4.22)

.010***
(4.22)

Firm size

.024**
(2.08)

.023**
(1.99)

.022*
(1.85)

.022*
(1.83)

.022*
(1.85)

.003
(.70)

.004
(.79)

.004
(.75)

.004
(.76)

.004
(.75)

.004***
(4.25)

.004***
(4.35)

.004***
(4.32)

.004***
(4.35)

.004***
(4.32)

CEO duality

.012
(1.36)

.011
(1.27)

.011
(1.24)

.011
(1.26)

.011
(1.24)

CEO ownership

.002
(1.24)

.002
(1.24)

.002
(1.22)

.002
(1.22)

.002
(1.22)

CEO tenure

-.0004
(-.65)

-.0003
(-.57)

-.0003
(-.57)

-.0003
(-.57)

-.0003
(-.57)

Leap from exploitation to exploration

-.010***
(-2.87)

-.022**
(-2.28)

-.010***
(-2.89)

-.022**
(-2.28)

Leap from exploration to exploitation

.059***
(2.85)

.059***
(2.85)

.061***
(1.09)

.062***
(1.10)

.007
(1.39)
.005**
(1.44)

.007
(1.46)

Firm diversification
M/B ratio

.007
(1.35)
Leap from exploitation to exploration
.005**
x Structural Holes
(1.44)
Leap from exploration to exploitation
-.001
-.001
x Structural Holes
(-.04)
(-.06)
Year fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Firm fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Observations
4,164
4,164
4,164
4,164
4,164
R-square
.0652
.0711
.0728
.0724
.0728
All tests are two-tailed: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.1. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Coefficients of year fixed effects are not shown due to space constraints. b. The coefficient values of R&D
expenditure is multiplied by 1.0e+4.
Structural Holes
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FIGURE 2.1.1 Interactions Between Leap from Exploration to Exploitation and Closeness
Centrality
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FIGURE 2.2.1 Interactions Between Leap from Exploitation to Exploration and Structural Holes
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